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The United States continues to be drawn into complex conflict environments 
where multiple internal and external state and non-state actors (NSAs) compete for 
influence. This thesis seeks to address how an external state actor can establish influence 
in a civil war environment through effective support of non-state actors. The research 
question is addressed through an in-depth analysis of the Lebanese Civil War from 1975 
to 1990, using both qualitative and social network analysis to assess the strategies of 
three state actors in that conflict: Israel, Syria, and Iran. This study suggests that external 
state actors can increase influence in a civil war environment through a variety of 
strategies. However, the most dominant state actors are typically those that pursue a 
limited objective through a combination of direct and indirect support to a heterogeneous 
coalition of non-state actors employing a combination of violent and non-violent 
techniques. The lessons obtained from this analysis may provide valuable insights to 
planners tasked with the development of influence within a civil war through external 
support to NSAs. 
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The study seeks to assist U.S. policymakers addressing civil wars by focusing on 
how to better support non-state actors (NSAs) to increase U.S. influence in intrastate 
conflicts. Civil wars present significant challenges for state actors seeking strategies 
aimed at influencing the outcome. Some states have dealt with these conflicts 
successfully, largely through the employment of strategies that center on proxies such as 
NSAs. External state actors have sometimes achieved their national strategic objectives 
by forming successful partnerships with NSAs with relatively little resource investment 
compared to the outcome. By studying how these intervening states have effectively 
supported their NSA allies, a general set of principles can be developed for effective 
external support to NSAs in intrastate conflict. 
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to inform a strategy for influencing civil wars by 
working through NSAs. The scope will focus on the case of the Lebanese Civil War, 
which resembles the Syrian conflict, to develop recommendations to increase state 
influence in civil war environment through effective support of NSAs. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis seeks to answer the following question: How can an external state 
actor increase its influence in civil wars by supporting local groups? This question will be 
addressed by evaluating a case in four areas:  
• What was the intervening state’s objective?  
• What types of NSAs did the state utilize to pursue its objective? 
• What type of activity did the state conduct to support the NSA?  
• How did the state channel its support to the NSA?  
The research will focus primarily on the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1992) 
because its antecedent conditions resemble those of the Syrian conflict. The case study 
will be assessed using the above framework. The empirical evidence of a case study will 
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provide corresponding or non-corresponding evidence to the hypothesis. Lessons from 
this analysis might prove useful in the development of an effective strategy for the Syrian 
conflict and other civil wars. 
C. HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis will examine the utility of a hypothesis that an external state seeking 
influence in intrastate conflicts through NSAs is most effective when the sponsor pursues 
limited objectives through indirect support of a crosscutting coalition of NSAs capable of 
employing non-violent and violent techniques. The logic of this hypothesis is based on 
several causal mechanisms. First, sponsoring a crosscutting coalition of NSAs broadens 
the appeal of the movement. Second, incorporating non-violent techniques further 
increases the potential scope of recruitment and mobilization. Third, indirect non-kinetic 
external support reduces the perception of foreign influence and furthers NSA legitimacy. 
Fourth, violent techniques are necessary in conjunction with non-violence because an 
intrastate conflict reflects a violent struggle between two or more movements with 
relative parity within a state. Any movement that fully adopts purely non-violent 
techniques in an ongoing civil war will face destruction in a struggle that is primarily 
about force superiority. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
In order to test the hypothesis about what constitutes effective state support to 
NSAs in civil wars, the “most similar” case method will be used to validate a conceptual 
theoretical framework. The most similar case method identifies cases that are similar in 
all of their independent variables except for a couple of key variables, which explains a 
variance in their dependent variables.1 The similar case method relies on John Stuart 
Mill’s method of difference, which can sometimes fail to identify the causal variables 
properly.2 In order to mitigate the risk of excluding possible causal independent 
variables, the history of each NSA and its respective sponsor relationship will be 
                                                
1 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 51. 
2 Ibid., 51. 
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analyzed using process-tracing methods. Process-tracing analyzes the causal chain 
between independent and dependent variables, and whether other variables may have 
been excluded during the most similar case study.3 Each NSA-sponsor relationship 
history will provide numerous observations that will help identify variables that either 
increased or decreased sponsor influence in the civil war environment through its NSA. 
Through the analysis of numerous observations, some recurring variables that lend to 
effective state sponsorship should become apparent. Process tracing will confirm or deny 
causal relationships between the independent and dependent variables identified in the 
hypothesis, as well as highlight any variables that were not originally identified. Once the 
variables are properly validated, they can serve as a valuable reference for U.S. 
policymakers responsible for developing strategies to influence civil wars. 
This thesis will use the Lebanese Civil War as the in-depth longitudinal case 
study that will help shape what types of support are applicable for Syria or other ongoing 
civil wars. Like the Syrian conflict, the Lebanese Civil War was typified as a deeply 
sectarian and brutal conflict involving multiple ethnically and religiously based violent 
NSAs with varying levels and origins of external state sponsorship that repeatedly shifted 
allegiances in the pursuit of victory as none could win on their own.4 Each conflict 
involves many of the same state actors, and similar ethnic and religious groups. However, 
there are differences between each case. The Lebanese conflict experienced multiple 
waves of large scale intervention by foreign conventional ground forces, while the Syrian 
conflict thus far has only seen limited direct foreign intervention, principally through air 
and special operations forces. The conclusions of this case study may prove useful to 
policymakers addressing Syria or other ongoing conflicts, but the unique conditions of 
each conflict must be taken into consideration before the application of any of this 
analysis. 
Within the Lebanese Civil War, the thesis will focus on in-depth case studies of 
external state actors and their sponsored NSAs and outcomes. The state strategies of 
                                                
3 John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 173. 
4 Edgar O’Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon, 1975–92 (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), ix. 
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Israel, Syria, and Iran will be evaluated during three periods of the war: 1975-1976, 
1977-1983, and 1984-1990. The periods separate eras of foreign dominance: first by 
Syria, then by Israel, and then again by Syria. Breaking them down in this manner 
enables a detailed comparative analysis of each of the state strategies through the three 
different periods, during which some states shifted strategies as necessary. The U.S. 
government policy toward Lebanon is not individually analyzed in this case study 
because they did not employ NSA relationships on the scale of the three other state 
actors, and U.S. policy often complimented rather than superseded other state’s strategies 
in Lebanon. For instance, in the 1977-1983 period, U.S. efforts largely supported Israel, 
while in the 1984-1990 period, U.S. policy eventually supported Syria in exchange for al-
Assad’s participation in Operation Desert Storm. However, U.S. policy toward Lebanon 
will be discussed in relation to the three state strategies. Through the comparative 
analysis of these somewhat similar cases, this thesis will evaluate the impact of the four 
main variables on the effectiveness of external support through process-tracing. The 
variables that most significantly recur with successful cases will represent the most 
effective methods to increase external state influence of the civil war environment 
through effective support of NSAs. The effective methods identified at the conclusion of 
the analysis will provide planners with a list of lessons for consideration in the 
development of a strategy for developing influence in civil wars.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Civil wars are on the rise, longer in duration, transnational, and more and more 
involve non-state actors (NSAs).5 Syria stands as a stark example of the current trends in 
conflict across the globe. In Syria, similar to some the other Arab Spring countries, non-
violent protests grew into a resistance movement. Popular non-violent resistance soon 
gave way to violent conflict as the state’s brutal repression led to the militarization and 
fragmentation of the opposition movements.6 Regional, and eventually, international 
powers became heavily involved in the conflict for their own individual reasons. NSAs 
continue to play an important role in the conflict as all sides employ them. Confronted 
with this very complex environment, states seeking to influence the conflict in pursuit of 
their national interests seek to employ NSAs as proxies. A key to succeeding in this 
environment will be the development and employment of NSAs whose capabilities and 
objectives align with the state sponsor’s objectives. The literature will be evaluated by 
four questions: What is the external state’s objective? What type of NSA can be utilized 
to pursue this objective? What type of activity the state can conduct to support the NSA? 
Moreover, how can the state channel its support to the NSA?  
A. DEFINING THE INTERVENING STATE’S OBJECTIVE 
The state’s objective will be categorized in accordance with U.S. military doctrine 
as follows: disrupt, coerce, or overthrow.7 These are the objectives of unconventional 
warfare, which is typically the mission of U.S. forces tasked with influencing civil war 
                                                
5 Doowan Lee and Glenn W. Johnson, “Revisiting the Social Movement Approach to Unconventional 
Warfare,” Small Wars Journal (December 2014): 1.  
6 Syria’s Metastasizing Conflict: Middle East Report N°143, (Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis 
Group 2013), i-ii, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon
/Syria/143-syrias-metastasising-conflicts.pdf. 
7 Department of Defense, Special Operations (JP 3–05) (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), 
xi.  
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environments on behalf of counter-state resistance.8 Disruption seeks to foster internal 
disorder in the targeted state in an effort to influence strategic outcomes. Coercion seeks 
to employ disruption to change targeted state behavior. Finally, overthrow is when the 
state seeks to completely change the targeted state’s leadership. Scholars vary on which 
technique is preferred, and much of this is situation dependent. However, the consensus is 
that overthrow is becoming less acceptable, overt or covert, and that disruption and 
coercion are the more reasonable and acceptable state pursuits in light of today’s political 
environment.9 
Stephen Kinzer argues that the United States historically pursued regime change 
in pursuit of its national interests abroad, beginning with the overthrow of the Hawaiian 
Monarchy in 1893.10 This long history of regime change via boots on the ground was 
temporarily halted during the Cold War as the Soviet Union challenged the United States’ 
freedom of maneuver overseas.11 During this period, the United States employed 
clandestine operations to overthrow regimes.12 However, with the end of the Cold War, 
and the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States once again pursued regime change 
via boots on the ground.13 Kinzer stands alone in this argument as other scholars argue 
that blatant regime change, especially via direct intervention, is no longer a viable 
national strategy. These experts advocate more limited approaches that emphasize 
disruption or coercion. 
Contrary to Kinzer’s argument that the end of the Cold War ushered in an era of 
free reign for the United States, Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William 
Rosenau, and David Brannan argue that the post-Cold War trend has been for states to 
                                                
8 When intervening on behalf of the state, U.S. forces typically conduct foreign internal defense and 
security force assistance, during which the objective is to build state capacity to provide security and 
governance. It will be shown that in some of the following case studies, state actors were conducting state 
reinforcement rather than counter-state support. 
9 Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2001), 103.  
10 Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (New York: 
Times Books, 2006), 2.  
11 Ibid., 2.  
12 Ibid., 2. 
13 Ibid., 2. 
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adopt more limited objectives.14 In the absence of the superpowers, regional powers have 
become more prevalent and their aims are necessarily more limited due to scarce 
resources.15 Zeev Maoz and Belgin San-Akca also identify the tendency of states to use 
this indirect, more limited approach, in pursuit of influencing regional rivals through 
cooperation with their opponent’s internal enemies.16 However, this strategy often results 
in escalating tensions between the two states, thereby threatening the direct confrontation 
the influencing state sought to avoid through its indirect strategy.17 Navin Bapat also 
argues that states are adept at using their opponent’s internal rivals through a form of 
coercive diplomacy in order to achieve their national interests.18 In a similar vein, Idean 
Salehyan, Kristian Gleditsch, and David Cunningham argue that states often support 
moderately strong resistance movements against their rivals as a tool to destabilize their 
rivals, not necessarily to overthrow them.19 Essentially all these scholars agree that states 
tend to pursue more limited objectives, such as coercion or disruption, rather than 
overthrow, in the pursuit of their national interests.  
B. SELECTING A NON-STATE ACTOR 
The literature suggests possible NSA candidates for state support can be broadly 
categorized as violent or non-violent and centralized or decentralized. Erica Chenoweth, 
Maria Stephan and other scholars advocate the power of non-violent movements, even 
opposed to repressive governments. Chenoweth’s research indicates that from 1900 to 
2006 non-violent movements succeeded 53 percent of the time while violent movements 
succeeded only 26 percent of the time.20 Chenoweth admits this is not a universal 
                                                
14 Byman, Trends in Outside Support, 103.  
15 Ibid., 103. 
16 Zeev Maoz and Belgin San-Akca, “Rivalry and State Support of Non-State Armed Groups (NAGs), 
1946–2011,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 4 (2012), 720–734.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Navin A. Bapat, “Understanding State Sponsorship of Militant Groups,” British Journal of Political 
Science 42, no. 1 (2012), 1.  
19 Idean Salehyan, Kristian S. Gleditsch and David E. Cunningham, “Explaining External Support for 
Insurgent Groups,” International Organization 65 (Fall, 2011), 712.  
20 Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, ““Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of 
Nonviolent Conflict,”“ International Security 33, no. 1 (2008), 8–9.  
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principal, but highlights that non-violent groups can more easily gain internal and 
external support at the loss of the target regime due to their greater perception of 
legitimacy.21 This success rate is likely linked to the increasing effects of propaganda 
thanks in large part to the greater distribution and accessibility of information technology.  
Though there is ample evidence of the potential for non-violent movements to 
succeed, the scholarly debate on violent resistance movements indicates a clear trend 
toward failure. In spite of seemingly conflicting opinions that violent guerrilla 
movements are increasingly winning (though still not the majority of the time) while non-
violent movements are actually more successful, many scholars are pointing out that 
modern trends in insurgency are rendering violent movements less effective.22 These 
scholars differentiate networked versus hierarchical organizational structures, but in 
social network analysis (SNA), everything is a network. What they describe as a network 
organization will be described as decentralized rather than centralized for the purpose of 
this thesis. Steven Metz identifies three models of insurgency that have prevailed 
historically, but today the prevalent model is the network, or what we will label from here 
forward as decentralized.23 This decentralized model, he argues, is more survivable and 
persistent, but in the end is much less likely to succeed because the decentralized 
insurgents do not grow beyond their hard-core base and gravitate toward terrorist activity 
instead of building popular support and establishing sanctuary.24 Thomas Rid and Mark 
Hecker argue along the same lines in War 2.0 as they describe militant groups as more 
resilient but at the same time less dangerous than they were in the past because of their 
lack of a popular base due in large part to their focus on organizing with like-minded 
extremists via information technology.25 Thomas Rid, Mark Hecker, and Steven Metz 
                                                
21 Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, “Why Civil Resistance Works,” 8–9. 
22 Steven Metz, ““The Internet, New Media, and the Evolution of Insurgency,”“ Parameters (Autumn, 
2012), 81 and Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker, War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2009), 208. 
23 Steven Metz, ““The Internet, New Media, and the Evolution of Insurgency,”“ Parameters (Autumn, 
2012), 81.  
24 Ibid., 81. 
25 Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker, War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Security International, 2009), 208.  
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argue that decentralized organization is driving resistance movements toward terrorism, 
which historically consistently results in failure.26 
Violent resistance has a much lower success rate than non-violent movements as 
shown above, but terrorism fares even worse. Max Boot emphasizes that terrorism is a 
technique used by resistance movements who cannot produce a guerrilla force and these 
terror-centric movements are less successful than guerrillas.27 Seth Jones also emphasizes 
the fact that excessive brutality by insurgents supports government victory.28 In addition, 
Jones points out that resistance groups employing suicide terrorism have never won an 
insurgency.29 Despite their historic lack of success, terror movements persist. While 
modern terror movements have been successful at achieving attention, acknowledgement, 
and recognition, they rarely achieve authority or governance.30 Bruce Hoffman highlights 
the role new media plays in facilitating the spread of terror propaganda, and these 
movements continue to evolve their techniques.31 Religious terror groups like al Qaeda 
employ violence to promote recognition and support for their ideology.32 While violent 
movements may not be the best NSA to support in pursuit of state interests, groups 
conducting terrorism should be avoided. 
Much like the scholarly debate over the strategic utility of violent versus non-
violent movements, the debate over decentralized versus centralized organizations is 
quite contentious. As stated earlier, scholars such as Rid and Metz argue that the 
decentralized model of resistance movements is less successful than previous insurgent 
models. According to them, decentralized insurgents do not effectively develop the 
                                                
26 Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” International Security 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 75–
76. 
27 Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the 
Present (New York: Liveright, 2013), 558.  
28 Seth G. Jones, Historical Lessons for the Wars in Iraq and Syria (United States, Congress, House, 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa) (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2015), 5–6, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT431/RAND_CT431.pdf.  
29 Ibid. 
30 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 255. 
31 Ibid., 228. 
32 Ibid., 290. 
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popular base necessary to achieve victory. They remain focused on their internal network 
and isolated from the population, leading them to adopt more violent tactics that only 
isolate them further. Decentralized network advocates, such as John Arquilla, argue quite 
the opposite. 
John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and the network advocates argue that thoroughly 
decentralized but highly connected networks are increasingly winning against 
hierarchical, or rather centralized, organizations.33 Centralized organizations are more 
top-down driven, bureaucratic, and often less flexible than decentralized organizations, 
which are often bottom-up, flat, and highly flexible. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt 
argue that centralized organizations are ineffective at fighting decentralized connected 
networks because it takes a similarly decentralized network to defeat another 
decentralized network.34 Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s decentralized networks are dispersed 
but held together by a common ideology or strategy, and can rapidly assemble for attacks 
and disperse just as rapidly.35 They attribute the rise of NSAs to the fact that they are 
predominantly decentralized networks capable of outmaneuvering centralized networks 
of states.36 Some scholars agree that these decentralized and connected networks are 
becoming prevalent, but are less effective, while other scholars advocate for centralized 
networks over the decentralized network model.37 
Advocates of institutionalized organizations see strength in centralized command 
and control and view the decentralized networked organization as less effective largely 
due to its apparent disorganization and fragmentation. Citing research done by the 
University of North Texas, Seth Jones argues that highly centralized insurgencies achieve 
victory 46 percent of the time while insurgencies with low centralization win only 15 
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percent of the time.38 However, the decentralized organization advocates would point out 
that comparing what they term a networked organization to a decentralized one is not 
appropriate. Similarly, Jon Alterman’s analysis of the Arab Spring challenges the 
perception that technologically connected organizations dominated the movements and 
set the conditions for revolution. Alterman points out that social media (internet and cell 
phones) actually had much less of an impact on the movement than mass media 
(television and newspapers).39 Mass media is still a very institutionalized medium that 
enables centralized organizations while social media enables a decentralized 
organization. In addition, Alterman argues that old-fashioned political groundwork truly 
brought the resistance to the tipping point; technology played a role, but ultimately it was 
the hierarchical, or centralized, political organizations that dominated the movement.40 
Their concept of networked organizations implies a decentralized network of individuals 
or groups that are united by common aims and are capable of massing rapidly for 
operations and then quickly dispersing, while decentralized organizations often lack the 
ability to coordinate without great effort due to a lack of connecting tissue through 
resilient communication networks, common ideology, or other binding ties. The failure of 
decentralization without binding ties is apparent in Syria where a plethora of localized 
guerrilla groups occasionally coordinate locally but fail to coordinate nationally for 
strategic effects.41 
C. SELECTION OF STATE ACTIVITIES TO SUPPORT NSA 
Once the NSA is selected the state’s decision makers must decide what kinds of 
support will be provided: kinetic or non-kinetic. Daniel Byman argues for four types of 
support to insurgent groups that have proven important: safe havens, financing, political 
support, and direct military support.42 Only one of these means of support is kinetic. Due 
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to the trends highlighted above, it is apparent that initially non-kinetic support is 
immediately preferable to kinetic for a number of reasons. Non-violent movements can 
be transitioned, if necessary, to violent ones. In contrast to predominantly violent 
movements, non-violent movements that adopt violence are more capable of moderation 
while violent movements are likely to further radicalize.43 Therefore, supporting non-
violent movements through non-kinetic actions may be the most preferred initial activity 
of the state sponsor. 
General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed 
Forces, “New Generation Warfare” concept highlights the non-kinetic approach to state 
support, and if necessary, its evolution to kinetic support. In the first phase the concept 
advocates fostering civil unrest through local opposition movements supported from 
affair by state-to-state threats against oppression of the unarmed movement.44 Eventually 
civil resistance crosses the state’s threshold of tolerance and results in a repression, which 
the Russian government is quick to capitalize on through a well-developed propaganda 
campaign.45 With justification for legitimate intervention established, the Russian 
government leverages all instruments of national power, diplomatic, information, 
economic, and military, to support the resistance movement.46 This new Russian 
approach highlights the synthesis of kinetic and non-kinetic means toward achieving a 
strategic objective through non-state surrogates, as demonstrated in Ukraine. 
In terms of kinetic support, it could be provided through either direct combat or 
support to combat. Jeffrey Record’s analysis of external assistance to insurgency 
indicates that high levels of direct military assistance were often critical in insurgent 
success throughout history.47 This support was not necessarily direct combat, but support 
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to combat forces through large infusions of military assistance.48 Daniel Byman’s 
analysis discovered that of 74 insurgencies since the end of the Cold War, that external 
assistance played a critical role in 45 of them.49 Max Boot also points out that the 
strongest correlation with success is outside support to the insurgent, especially via 
conventional ground force support.50 However, many scholars advocate a non-kinetic 
assistance approach, in the end, force of arms either direct or support to, may have to be 
the deciding factor in NSA success. 
D. DETERMINING HOW TO CHANNEL SUPPORT TO THE NSA 
In discussing channels for support the scholars fall into categories in line with 
their preference for the type of activity. That is, non-kinetic advocates typically favor the 
indirect support approach while kinetic advocates favor the direct approach. In pursuing 
the more limited objective of coerce or disrupt the state is also likely to channel that 
support through indirect channels for a number of reasons. By utilizing indirect channels 
through a third party, such as another NSA, the state can establish some level of 
deniability as is often required in leveraging NSAs for diplomatic purposes. Daniel 
Byman points out that states can even provide support indirectly by essentially doing 
nothing.51 A state may understand that by allowing an NSA to gather support for its 
movement in its territory they are by default facilitating that NSA’s growth.52 The 
potential for a state’s acquiescence to NSA activities within its borders provides 
opportunities for NSAs to develop support networks anywhere across the globe.    
As stated in the previous section, kinetic advocates often simultaneously highlight 
the importance of direct channels. Kinetic support indicates a level of commitment well 
beyond the level of non-kinetic support. Kinetic support, whether through direct combat 
or support to combat, indicates that the supporting state has likely placed a high priority 
on overthrow or strong coercive action. Byman highlights that proxy warfare to depose 
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an opponent’s government requires an exponential increase in support compared to 
sustaining an insurgency for limited objectives such as disruption in pursuit of foreign 
policy goals.53 Byman also argues that although NSAs can be utilized effectively to 
provide support to other NSAs, overall the greater impact often comes from direct state 
support.54 
This section has discussed how states provide effective support to NSAs by 
reviewing scholarship on supporting state’s objectives, the state’s selection of NSAs, the 
selection of types of activity to support the NSA, and the channel for state support. After 
analyzing the literature it is apparent that significant agreement exists in terms of the rise 
of non-state actors, the importance of external state support in NSA success or failure, 
and the preference for limited objectives such as disrupt or coerce versus more unlimited 
objectives such as overthrow. The literature leaves a lot to be desired in terms of what 
factors should be combined to construct a strategy for states supporting NSAs in 
intrastate conflicts in pursuit of policy objectives. This thesis aims to fill this gap by 
analyzing what types of external support are more associated with effective NSAs. 
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III. THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR: 1975-1976 
By the end of 1976, Syria’s direct intervention in the Lebanese Civil War 
appeared to have brought the conflict to a conclusion. As war broke out in April 1975, 
Syria, always an active participant in Lebanese politics, kept a watchful eye on events as 
the conflict transitioned into a civil war between the Maronite Christian status-quo bloc 
versus the predominantly Muslim revisionist bloc. Throughout the period President Hafez 
al-Assad’s Regime in Damascus focused on two policy objectives: 1) that Lebanon 
remain a unified state, and 2) the Palestinian resistance forces remain a viable threat to 
Israel from southern Lebanon.55 The Syrian government’s pursuit of these policy 
objectives was ultimately practical rather than ideological, shifting support between 
various officials and organizations in order to achieve its objectives. From April 1975 to 
December 1976 Syrian strategy toward Lebanon went through three phases: diplomatic 
mediation, indirect intervention via proxy militias, and finally direct intervention with 
Syrian ground forces.56 By the end of 1976 an Arab League agreement had given Assad’s 
military occupation of Lebanon an heir of legitimacy and had ensured that partition along 
confessional lines would not occur. Additionally, much of the Palestinian resistance 
forces were coordinating with rather than opposing Syrian leadership.  
In contrast to Syria’s dominant position within Lebanon at the conclusion of 
1976, the Israeli government ultimately found itself settling on the best of three bad 
options concerning its policy toward Lebanon. As the Syrians directly intervened in the 
summer of 1976, the Israeli government under Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin debated 
three options: 1) intervene directly and risk a war with Syria that could spoil its newfound 
detente with Egypt, 2) let Syria dominate the Lebanese state unhindered, or 3) accept the 
Syrian intervention with caveats.57 Ultimately, the Israelis chose the third option, 
communicating via third parties to the Syrian government a series of red lines that 
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ultimately reinforced the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) position in 
Lebanon rather than reduce it.58 With the Civil War over at the end of 1976, the conflict 
transitioned more into one dominated by interstate conflict as Israel, unsatisfied with its 
weakened position, competed with Syria for influence in Lebanon.59 In the period 
between April 1975 and December 1976 the Syrian government increasingly dominated 
the Lebanese landscape while its strategic rival, the Israeli government, acquiesced to 
Syrian designs for Lebanon only to discover by the end of that period that its policy had 
greatly reduced its own national security. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 1975-1976 
As the war broke out, the factions generally aligned on two sides, those that 
sought to retain the current confessional system based on the 1943 National Pact that 
essentially favored the Maronites, versus the revisionists who sought to uproot this 
system in order to spread power more equitably among the predominate confessions of 
Maronites, Sunni Muslims, and Shiite Muslims. Throughout the conflict the government 
of Lebanon continued to exist, but under the political stalemate former government 
officials and even current ones would employ their political party’s respective militia in 
order to alter the physical and political environment. As the fighting intensified in 1975, 
the Syrian government implemented a strategy of mediation, which occasionally 
achieved ceasefires between the warring factions, though with only short lived success.60 
While diplomatic mediation remained the focus of the Syrian government through 1975, 
al-Assad and his senior leadership did not refrain from indirect intervention through the 
occasional employment of proxy militias where necessary. In July 1975, for instance, a 
Syrian-backed Palestinian guerrilla unit crossed the border from Syria to restore order on 
behalf of the Beirut government in Tripoli in northern Lebanon.61 As the fighting 
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intensified and threatened to permanently divide the country, indirect intervention via 
Syrian-backed proxy forces became increasingly preferred. In January 1976 the Syrian 
government’s preference for indirect proxy intervention became the norm.62  
In order to support primarily Muslim revisionist forces fighting Maronite status 
quo militias in Beirut, on January 19, 1976 the al-Assad government dispatched two 
brigades of its Palestinian proxy militia units across the border to assist the revisionists.63 
While this event ushered in a shift in Syrian strategy, mediation still remained critical to 
al-Assad’s efforts in Lebanon. Shortly after dispatching its proxy forces to assist the 
revisionists, the Syrian government began a new diplomatic initiative in order to modify 
the confessional system in order to split parliament 50:50 between the Muslim and 
Christian communities, rather than the current 40:60 split, which favored the Christians.64 
A longtime ally of Syria in Lebanon, and the dominant faction of the revisionist Lebanese 
National Movement (LNM) coalition, Walid Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party 
(PSP), rejected the Syrian proposal and continued fighting.65 The belligerence of 
Jumblatt toward al-Assad’s mediation efforts forced a break in their alliance, and 
contributed to a dramatic shift in the Syrian government’s strategy in Syria. Another 
major contributing factor to al-Assad’s direct intervention was the breakup of the 
Lebanese Army in March 1976.66 With the loss of this stabilizing force, no longer would 
the occasional application of relatively small proxy militias be able to tip the balance in 
favor of Syrian policy.67 During the indirect intervention phase the Syrian government 
did not blatantly supporting either revisionist or status quo forces. However, as the LNM 
began rapidly gaining power in the spring of 1976 the Syrian government decided to 
directly intervene on behalf of the LNM’s opponents in order to prevent their victory.   
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In response to a rising tide of LNM victories over the Maronite militias in the 
spring of 1976, the Syrian government decided to shift to a strategy of direct military 
intervention on behalf of the status quo Lebanese government in order to prevent an 
LNM victory or possibly the breakup of Lebanon.68 Prior to their direct military 
intervention in Lebanon on 1 June 1976, the al-Assad government gained tacit approval 
for its actions from the U.S. and Israeli governments by pledging that their forces were 
intervening on behalf of the Christian-dominated Lebanese government.69 Though the 
Syrian government was acting in its own interests in Lebanon, Lebanon’s President 
Sulieman Franjiah, a Christian, did request al-Assad’s forces intervene on his 
government’s behalf.70 By the fall of 1976 Syrian forces, assisted by their proxy 
Palestinian militias and other militia allies in Lebanon, had the LNM and its PLO allies 
on their heels, spurring Arab League diplomatic intervention on their behalf in October 
1976.71 At the conclusion of the October 1976 ceasefire, the Arab League agreed to 
sponsor an Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) that would essentially consist of mostly Syrian 
forces nominally under the command of newly elected Lebanese President Ilyas Sarkis, 
but in reality under the command of a Syrian general.72 The agreement also reaffirmed 
Lebanon, Syria, and the PLO’s commitment to the 1969 Cairo Agreement, whereby 
Yasser Arafat’s guerrillas were allowed to operate against Israel from Lebanese territory 
so long as they did not interfere with Lebanese sovereignty.73 As 1976 closed, Syrian 
forces under the umbrella of the ADF quietly took their positions across Syria as a 
fragmented society exhausted by the first stage of the Civil War licked its wounds.  
While the Syrians were rapidly escalating their involvement in Lebanon 
throughout 1976, the Israelis were also taking action to improve their influence on the 
civil war environment. In the years prior to the war the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 
averaged two territorial violations of Lebanon a day in their war against Palestinian 
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guerrillas operating there.74 In the first year of the civil war those incursions increased 
dramatically to an average of seventeen a day in the first eight months of 1975.75 
Beginning in the spring of 1976, Israel pursued ties with both the Maronite community in 
Beirut and to the north as well as in southern Lebanon near the Israeli border.76 Starting 
in March of 1976, Israeli officials began evaluating suitable Christian militias in the 
Beirut region to support, meeting with Pierre Gemayel of the Phalange Party, and 
Camille Chamoun of the National Liberal Party (NLP) via Israeli missile boats.77 In the 
south, Israel built ties to the Christian villages through the “Good Fence” policy whereby 
Christian Lebanese could easily cross the border to conduct commerce in Israeli 
villages.78 In response to Syria’s direct military intervention in June 1976, Israel 
communicated a series of red lines to include demands that Syria not advance south of 
the Zahrani River and not to interfere with Israeli aircraft operating over Lebanese 
airspace.79 Though the Rabin government chose to tolerate Syria’s direct intervention in 
Lebanon, by the end of 1976 the Israelis were providing small arms, antitank missiles, 
light tanks, and millions of dollars in assistance to the Maronite militias.80 Ironically, by 
the end of 1976 it appeared as though the two remaining belligerents in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict were supporting the same side in Lebanon’s civil war. 
B. SYRIAN STRATEGY  
1. Objective  
Syria’s objective throughout its three-phase intervention in the civil war through 
December 1976 was to maintain the unity of the Lebanese state and maintain leverage 
over the PLO by way of reinforcing the existing government in Beirut. The policy in 
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Lebanon was part of a greater policy focused against Israel. Following its loss of Egypt as 
a strategic ally against Israel during the post-1973 rapprochement between the two states, 
Syria sought a new strategic balance.81 Dissatisfied with previous negotiations with Israel 
that favored either the Palestinians or Egyptians over Syrian interests, al-Assad sought to 
create a new strategic situation that would give Syria the necessary military strength to 
negotiate bilaterally in order to regain the Golan Heights through negotiation.82 By way 
of controlling Lebanon and gaining greater influence over the PLO’s campaign against 
Israel from Lebanon, al-Assad hoped to realign the strategic balance in order to enable 
eventual bilateral negotiations between Israel and Syria.83  
Reinforcing the existing government in Beirut did not just support Syria’s primary 
objective of gaining greater parity with Israel, it also served a number of secondary 
interests. First, by intervening in Lebanon al-Assad hoped to minimize the threat of 
spillover from a conflict that was amongst many of the same confessions that divided his 
own society.84 The al-Assad government is, in fact, not only a minority Alawi regime, 
but also one reliant on the al-Assad clan itself for rule, and the primary threat to power 
came from within the Alawi community itself and then from the other religious 
factions.85 Second, intervention in Lebanon offered the Syrian government economic 
incentives by the fact that the instability threatened the hundreds of thousands of Syrians 
working abroad there, and the occupation brought greater access to Lebanese capital and 
markets.86 However, as with any military occupation, there were significant costs 
involved for Syria, but ultimately the policy proved to be worth the possible expense for 
the al-Assad government.87 While the secondary reasons for the Syrian government’s 
intervention were notable, ultimately al-Assad and his advisors chose to intervene in 
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order to reinforce the Lebanese government as a part of a broader government policy 
toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
2. Allied Agents in Lebanon  
While Syria eventually resorted to direct military intervention in order to prop up 
its allies in Lebanon, throughout its entire campaign during the 1975–1976 period, the 
Syrian government leveraged relationships with both state and non-state actors. Syria’s 
reinforcing strategy toward the Lebanese government implied that al-Assad was 
committed first and foremost to his political allies within the Lebanese government. The 
Lebanese Civil War consisted largely of former and current political officials within the 
Lebanese government fighting each other via their militias, but the presidency and prime 
minister position remained functional through much of the war despite the constitutional 
requirement that a Christian hold the presidency and a Sunni Muslim serve as prime 
minister.88 During Syria’s indirect intervention phase, al-Assad continued to back 
President Franjiah but also coerced him into accepting an early election for his 
replacement in exchange for Syrian support against the LNM militias that opposed him.89 
On 8 May 1976, Syrian-backed Elias Sarkis, assisted by the presence of Syrian proxy 
militiamen from the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) and Saiqa, won the early elections 
for the presidency against the LNM-backed Raymond Edde.90 As Syrian forces under the 
ADF banner assumed their occupation of Lebanon in November 1976, President Sarkis 
met with the prominent leaders of the Christian Lebanese Forces (LF) in order to 
convince them to accept the arrangement.91 The Lebanese Prime Minister throughout this 
period, Rashid Karami, was also under Syrian influence, which helped facilitate the 
Syrian intervention under the guise of supporting the Lebanese government.92 By 
maintaining significant political influence over the heads of the Lebanese state, the 
Syrian government also gained influence over the Lebanese security forces. Al-Assad’s 
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influence over the Lebanese state and its armed forces was central to his strategy prior to 
the army’s collapse in March 1976, after which his NSA allies would become central in 
his efforts to reinforce the Lebanese government.  
While the Syrian government would ally with Lebanese militias as opportunities 
and necessities to do so arose, al-Assad first leaned heavily on his Palestinian proxy 
forces to conduct armed intervention on his behalf. The two principal Syrian proxy forces 
were Saiqa and the PLA. Saiqa, the Syrian acronym for the Vanguards of the Popular 
Liberation War, was a Palestinian commando organization based in Syria, trained and led 
by Syrian officers.93 The PLA was another Palestinian militia operating from Syria that 
took orders from al-Assad.94 While both Syrian proxies were Palestinian and under the 
overall command of the PLO under Yasser Arafat, they in fact took their orders from the 
Syrian President.95 These units were repeatedly used to doing al-Assad’s bidding, almost 
to their breaking point during the period of Syrian direct intervention. As the Syrian 
government increased its indirect intervention via its Palestinian proxy forces in the 
spring of 1976, these forces were not only used to fight revisionist forces under the LNM, 
but also Palestinian forces that were fighting alongside the revisionists.96 The internecine 
fighting amongst the Palestinian factions induced many defections during the summer of 
1976, as Syrian-backed Palestinian fighters refused to fight their brothers in Lebanon.97 
As a result of its blind allegiance to the Syrian President, the PLO expelled Saiqa from 
the organization.98 While Syria’s Palestinian proxy forces proved quite useful throughout 
the intervention, al-Assad’s repeated attempts to throw them against other Palestinian 
factions in Lebanon nearly left them broken by the end of 1976.  
Following direct intervention in June 1976, the Syrian government continued to 
seek out alliances with other NSA’s that aligned with its interests. Throughout 1976 
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Syrian forces showed a willingness to work with any group that proved willing and able, 
whether Christian, Sunni Muslim, Shiite Muslim, or otherwise. Though Syrian 
intervention against the LNM temporarily drove the Lebanese Arab Army (a Muslim 
faction of the Lebanese Army that had broken away from the army during the March 
collapse) and the PLO toward the revisionists, al-Assad’s forces proved adept at 
gradually breaking up the alliance.99 During Syria’s indirect intervention in the spring of 
1976, Amal, the only major Shiite militia at the time, officially distanced itself from the 
LNM and would remain a loyal ally to the Syrian government through the remainder of 
the war.100 By mid-June 1976 the Syrian army was attracting defectors from the LAA to 
its new Lebanese army effort called the Vanguards of the Lebanese Army.101 The PLO’s 
agreement with the Arab League during the October 1976 ceasefire ended its alliance 
with the LNM and the organization returned to al-Assad’s orbit.102 The plethora of 
Christian militias, through the influence of President Sarkis, also agreed to accept Syrian 
occupation by the end of 1976.103 Syria’s strategy sidelined the major militias by either 
allying with them or coercing them into sidelining themselves. It is no coincidence that 
Kamal Jumblatt, leader of the LNM and the pernicious thorn in the side of al-Assad’s 
efforts throughout 1976, was assassinated in March 1977.104  
3. Methods of Supporting Allies 
Syrian support for its allies in Lebanon was comprehensive and included political, 
logistical, and direct military support. Syrian political support focused on supporting 
those Lebanese politicians and organizations that would support Syrian policy. 
Throughout the mediation period of al-Assad’s intervention he sought to prevent either 
sect from becoming too dominant within Lebanon, which could threaten Syrian interests 
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there.105 He ensured that the politicians he backed remained in power. In January 1976 
Prime Minister Karami threatened to resign in frustration, but al-Assad convinced him to 
stay on, thus gaining greater influence.106 By the spring of 1976, under attack from LNM 
militias, President Franjiah agreed to cut his own presidential term short in exchange for 
Syrian indirect intervention on his government’s behalf via Saiqa and PLA militia 
units.107 Al-Assad’s support for President Sarkis (who replaced President Franjiah in a 
Syrian-influenced election) was reciprocated when the Lebanese President accepted 
Syrian occupation under the terms of the October 1976 Riyadh Peace Agreement.108  
The Syrian government also provided political support to its allied NSAs in order 
to legitimize their actions within Lebanon. In October 1975 al-Assad formulated the 
Damascus Agreement with Arafat and PM Karami that allowed units of the PLO to patrol 
Muslim parts of Beirut, essentially legitimizing the PLO’s policing actions in 
Lebanon.109 The Syrian government’s commitment to the Cairo Agreement also 
reinforced the PLO’s legitimacy in Lebanon, as the agreement reaffirmed the 
Palestinians’ rights to carry out their struggle for the liberation of Palestine from southern 
Lebanon. Syria’s proxy forces, the PLA and Saiqa, were both legitimized politically by 
instances where the Lebanese government called for their use in Lebanon.110 Syrian 
government lines of political support fostered a reciprocal relationship of political 
support between the Syrian and Lebanese governments, and its inroads with the 
government further legitimized the efforts of its proxy forces in Lebanon.  
While the Syrian government did not provide significant logistical support to the 
Lebanese government, its support to both its Palestinian proxies and Lebanese NSA allies 
was significant. The al-Assad government provided safe haven to multiple Palestinian 
militias operating from within its borders. Saiqa was the most capable Palestinian force 
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operating from Syrian territory, whose leadership was Syrian officers, received Syrian 
training and military equipment as well as safe haven by operating from Syrian 
territory.111 The PLO’s assistance from the Syrian government proved so significant that 
President al-Assad repeatedly used its support as a carrot for PLO cooperation. In 
exchange for their signature to the October 1976 agreement, al-Assad reopened the 
“Arafat Trail,” an illicit supply route to PLO forces in Lebanon through Syria.112 Al-
Assad even supported the PSP up until Jumblatt objected to the Syrian proposed reforms 
and subsequently had their Syrian supplies cut.113 During their invasion in the first week 
of June 1976, Syrian forces faced stiff resistance from LNM and Palestinian forces, many 
of which were equipped with antitank missiles provided by Syria itself.114 Syrian support 
of its proxies, allies, and former enemies was so generous it helped ensure that Lebanon 
was awash with weapons, and while it created circumstances where its own weapons 
were used against it, it left little doubt to those seeking a sponsor in Lebanon that 
President al-Assad was willing to hand out weapons to any group that would take his 
orders, even occasionally.      
The Syrian government’s direct military intervention in the conflict in June 1976 
reflected its willingness to undertake widespread-armed intervention, but both before and 
during the direct intervention Syrian leadership often proved effective at determining 
when and how to use military force judiciously. Despite the apparent brazenness with 
which the Syrian government undertook direct intervention in Syria, the al-Assad 
government took deliberate steps to avoid inciting unnecessary conflict with state actors 
and NSAs within Lebanon. Syria’s preference for employment of its NSA proxies rather 
than its regular forces typified the government’s cautious approach to direct military 
support. While Syrian proxies were intervening on the behalf of the al-Assad government 
from the summer of 1975, the first direct intervention of Syrian forces in Lebanon was in 
April 1976 under an incursion into the Bekaa Valley during which it took over positions 
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occupied by its PLA and Saiqa proxies.115 During Syria’s direct intervention in June, 
heavy fighting with LNM and Palestinian units convinced them to adopt a different 
military strategy as its summer campaign continued into the fall. As fighting continued 
and centered on urban areas, Syrian forces adopted a strategy of attrition by operating 
across the country, cutting off its opponents from their supply lines, while employing its 
proxies and allies as necessary to directly fight its opponents.116 In September 1976 
Syrian forces applied the lessons they learned during the June invasion in an effective 
campaign against the LNM and their PLO allies, which proved so successful that the 
Arab League was compelled to intervene diplomatically on Yasser Arafat’s behalf.117 
Syria’s direct military intervention to support its state and NSA allies within Lebanon 
was done in synch with its other lines of efforts both politically and logistically to support 
its allies. The transition to direct intervention did not cause Syria to lose sight of its other 
efforts, and the Syrian government proved flexible in applying military force where 
necessary, and indirect force whenever possible. 
4. Assessment of Strategy  
At the end of 1976 Syria dominated the Lebanese landscape politically, 
economically, and militarily under the diplomatic veil of the Riyadh Agreement of 
October 1976. A large part of the success of this plan was the Syrian government’s 
commitment to a limited objective of regime reinforcement. President al-Assad’s strategy 
for Lebanon was a critical subset of his overall policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 
and thus justified the incredible cost requisite with direct military intervention. However, 
the Syrian government’s strategy evolved over time, beginning with mediation, then 
indirect intervention via proxy militia, and finally direct military intervention as the 
situation required. Each shift in strategy reflected the government’s reactive response to 
an increasingly unstable and violent situation that threatened Lebanese partition and 
possible Israeli intervention. Ultimately the objective remained limited in that instead of 
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outright regime change, the policy was regime reinforcement, where over time Syrian 
officials leveraged their influence in the conflict to empower their own political leaders in 
Lebanon thus establishing a reciprocal political relationship where each government 
mutually legitimized the other’s efforts. 
Syrian strategy also succeeded because it adapted to utilize an indirect rather than 
a direct approach. The al-Assad government only resorted to direct military action when 
it found it essential to achieve its strategic objectives for Lebanon. Prior to its full-scale 
direct intervention in the conflict in June of 1976, the Syrians repeatedly attempted 
mediation to resolve the conflict in their favor. By November 1976 55 previous ceasefire 
agreements, many of which were negotiated by Syrian mediators, had been broken.118 In 
multiple situations requiring armed intervention the Syrians used indirect means via their 
Palestinian proxy forces rather than applying their own military forces. Using these 
indirect forces, some of which were employed at the request of the either the Lebanese 
President or Prime Minister, furthered the legitimacy of the proxy forces themselves as 
well as the government officials they were representing. In the instances where Syria 
eventually felt compelled to intervene directly, these efforts brought great strain on their 
political allies in the Lebanese government as much of the population questioned the 
legitimacy of officials who would support the interference of outsiders in Lebanese 
affairs. However, typically whenever possible, even after direct military intervention, the 
Syrian officials preferred to resort to indirect means in order to put a Lebanese, or at least 
Palestinian face, on an action rather than a Syrian one. Even the diplomatic legitimacy 
afforded to the Syrian occupation by the Riyadh Agreement highlighted the indirectness 
of the strategy as Syrian units operated under the orders of the Lebanese President within 
an Arab League coalition.  
Syrian strategy in Lebanon succeeded in this period partly because of their ability 
to maintain a rather heterogeneous and flexible coalition of individual groups that were 
generally homogenous in their own makeup. Al-Assad’s strategy in Lebanon followed 
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the principals of Realpolitik: “Syria ha[d] neither eternal allies nor perpetual enemies.”119 
In practice, this meant that al-Assad was willing to shift his support amongst the various 
confessions and NSAs as he saw fit in order to ensure the success of his policy in 
Lebanon. Throughout the 1975–1976 time period the Syrians shifted their allegiance 
between Maronite and Muslim factions, and amongst Palestinian groups, and at any given 
time they were aligned with members of each faction simultaneously. The Realpolitik 
strategy provided Syrian officials flexibility in Lebanon, and their emphasis on 
practicality rather than ideology allowed them to maintain a strong enough heterogonous 
coalition that the opponents arrayed against it could not seriously obstruct the Syrian 
coalition. 
Syrian policy in Lebanon during the first phase of the war also succeeded due to a 
balanced use of both violent and non-violent techniques by its own allies and proxies as 
well as Syrian forces themselves. The Syrian strategy in Lebanon first emphasized a non-
violent mediation approach at the state level, accompanied by the judicious application of 
violence where necessary in order to break political stalemate. However, when fighting 
threatened Syria’s interests in Lebanon, the Syrian coalition did not refrain from 
excessive use of violence to achieve its objectives. President al-Assad was by no means a 
peace advocate, but he did take into account that containing excessive violence was vital 
to his project of maintaining the unity of the Lebanese state. In numerous instances in this 
period, al-Assad acted militarily either directly or indirectly in order to ensure that a 
negotiated agreement that challenged his influence did not occur. In one example, on the 
eve of the June 1976 invasion, the leader of the LNM, Kamal Jumblatt, communicated a 
desire to cooperate with the newly elected President Sarkis, but the Syrian intervention 
destroyed any prospect of rapprochement between the Syrian-backed Lebanese President 
and their main Lebanese-NSA rival.120 Syria’s strategy in this period succeeded in part 
because the government judiciously applied violent techniques where necessary, and used 
non-violent political mediation whenever possible. 
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Overall Syrian strategy from 1975 to 1976 succeeded in Lebanon because the 
government pursued a limited objective through principally indirect means in support of a 
heterogonous coalition of both state and NSA allies employing both violent and non-
violent techniques. This strategy was far from perfect, and Syrian intervention did suffer 
significant consequences domestically as a result of its intervention on behalf of a 
Christian-dominated government in Beirut. In the following years, a terror campaign and 
insurgency by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood pointed to al-Assad’s Lebanese 
intervention as a major cause for action.121 Additionally, the apparent success of the 
Syrian intervention at the end of 1976 only lasted so long, as fighting escalated to a scale 
Syrian officials probably did not foresee.122 At the end of December 1976 the future was 
far from certain, but the Syrian government would not have been unreasonable in 
claiming success based on the fact that their politicians were in power in Lebanon, the 
country was relatively peaceful under Arab League sponsored Syrian occupation, and its 
principal enemy at the time, the LNM, appeared sidelined. 
C. ISRAELI STRATEGY  
1. Objective  
Following Syria’s direct intervention in Lebanon in June 1976 the Rabin 
Administration adopted a policy of reinforcing the status quo Lebanese political system. 
As the civil war unfolded, two factions within the Rabin administration emerged: those 
that supported intervention, and those that opposed it. Foreign Minister Yigal Allon led 
the pro-interventionist wing of the government, advocating direct intervention in 
Lebanon in order to establish two states, one Christian and the other Druze.123 Prime 
Minister Rabin represented the other wing. Rabin was cautious toward Israeli meddling 
in Lebanese political affairs, and advocated reinforcing the status quo against the PLO 
backed revisionist coalition.124 After Syria intervened in June 1976, PM Rabin settled on 
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his policy of reinforcing the status quo, though with caveats communicated to the Syrians 
via third parties.125 The Israeli policy placed them on the same side as the Syrian 
government, as the Syrian army directly intervened to reinforce the Lebanese status quo 
government.126 
The Rabin policy toward Lebanon proved advantageous for several reasons. First, 
this option reduced the chances of igniting another Arab-Israeli war due to direct conflict 
with Syria in Lebanon.127 Second, Israel’s NSA enemy in Lebanon, the PLO, was also a 
target of the Syrian offensive in the summer of 1976.128 Third, this policy was in line 
with Israel’s most important ally, the United States, which had come to view Syria as a 
stabilizing force in the chaotic civil war environment.129 The Israeli government later 
found that by the end of 1976, their policy toward Lebanon not only strengthened Syria, 
but also the PLO, thus contributing to a decline in Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis its 
remaining enemies in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
2. Allied Agents in Lebanon  
Israel’s allies in Lebanon consisted primarily of a largely homogenous coalition 
of Maronite Christian political leaders and their respective militias. Israel began meeting 
members of the various Maronite factions as early as March 1976 via nighttime transits 
between the Christian controlled port of Jounieh in Lebanon and the Israeli port of Haifa 
using Israeli missile boats.130 After numerous meetings over a span of months, the 
Israelis settled on supporting Pierre Gemayel and his Phalange militia under the 
command of his son, Bashir.131 The Israeli decision to support the Phalange did not come 
lightly. During one pilot team operation the Phalange showed off body parts they had 
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collected as war trophies in recent fighting with Palestinians.132 Nevertheless, as early as 
May 1976 the Israelis were shipping weapons to the Maronite militias in the Beirut area 
via the port of Jounieh.133 
The Israelis also built ties with NSAs in southern Lebanon as well. In 1976 Israel 
adopted the “Good Fence” policy along the southern border near Lebanese Christian 
villages in order to allow Lebanese Christians to cross the border to conduct commerce, 
work as laborers, and receive medical care.134 The policy facilitated the development of 
Israel’s proxy force in the south, under the command of a salaried major in the Lebanese 
Army.135 The border policy also enabled the transit of Maronite militiamen from the 
Beirut area into southern Lebanon via the Israeli border.136 By the end of 1976, the Rabin 
government had developed two NSA allies within Lebanon, a principally Phalange based 
militia in the Beirut area as well as a Christian proxy militia of its own making in the 
southern border region. 
3. Methods of Supporting Allies 
During this period of Israel’s involvement in the Lebanese Civil War the Rabin 
government’s support of their NSA allies in Lebanon consisted primarily of logistical and 
indirect military support. Both Israel and their Lebanese allies in central Lebanon avoided 
overt political support of each other because of the negative implications for the 
Christians in Lebanon had their Israeli support become common knowledge at the time. 
During one meeting, Pierre Gemayel communicated to the Israelis that he was ashamed 
to have to ask for their support.137 The Israeli government did provide broad political 
support to the Christian community, which directly benefited their NSA allies. Via 
backchannel communications the Israelis received guarantees from the al-Assad 
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government that the direct intervention was intended to protect the Christian 
community.138 
Due to the political sensitivity involved, the Israeli government primarily used 
indirect means to provide extensive logistical support to its Christian NSA allies in 
central Lebanon, while in the south they employed both indirect and direct means of 
providing logistical support. Shortly after committing to arming the Maronite militias, 
Israel began providing small arms, antitank guided missiles, and obsolete tanks.139 Israeli 
financial investments in the Maronite militias amounted to $150 million in the first three 
years alone.140 The Israeli “Good Fence” policy provided economic advantages to the 
Christian community in the south.141 In some villages their water and electrical systems 
were even connected to Israeli ones.142 To the Phalange and its allies in the Christian 
coalition of the Lebanese Forces, Israeli naval dominance of the Lebanese coast allowed 
the continued flow of support via the Christian controlled port of Jounieh.143 Israel also 
provided extensive military support to its NSA allies in Lebanon. 
The Israeli government not only provided indirect military assistance to its allies 
in Lebanon such as military training, they also repeatedly intervened directly with its 
armed forces against Palestinian militia units, though whether those actions in this period 
benefited its Christian allies is questionable. The Israelis were actively involved in 
training its proxy militia in southern Lebanon.144 In addition to military training for its 
allies in the south, the IDF would frequently conduct cross border raids to attack 
Palestinian forces in order to disrupt their attempts to launch cross-border attacks into 
Israel.145 However, this is not to argue that the raids necessarily benefited its Christian 
allies in the south. The repeated violation of Lebanese sovereignty by Israeli forces 
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increased antipathy toward Israel from across Lebanese society. In 1968, one such raid 
and the inadequacy of the government’s response forced the Lebanese government to 
resign in the face of mass protests.146 As the war progressed in the south, Israel 
increasingly provided military support to its Lebanese allies, to include cross-border 
artillery support.147 The IDF also supported its allies in Lebanon by maintaining a naval 
blockade on LNM and PLO controlled ports, to include Sidon and Tyre in southern 
Lebanon.148 Israel’s military support of its Christian allies focused on the south 
throughout 1976, as the IDF fought to destroy the Palestinian resistance forces operating 
there. While Israel often provided direct military support in the south, principally for its 
own defense rather than to aid its Christian allies at this time, their NSA allies in central 
Beirut received primarily indirect non-kinetic military support consisting of military 
training at this time due to both Phalange and Israeli leaders’ political concerns. 
4. Assessment of Strategy 
At the end of 1976 the Israeli government found that its policy toward Lebanon 
and the Syrian military intervention had permitted a dramatic increase in its state and 
NSA rivals’ influence there while reducing its own. In a way though, Israel’s policy 
objective to reinforce the status quo Lebanese government was accomplished. The Rabin 
government’s acquiescence to the Syrian intervention ensured that the status quo forces 
would retain political power in Lebanon for the foreseeable future. Israel achieved its 
limited objective in Lebanon, though it was directly the result of its archrival’s actions 
rather than its own. However, as Syria was undertaking its direct intervention in Lebanon, 
the Israeli government executed a deliberate campaign to develop influence in Lebanon 
through the Maronite militias. Though this strategy did not show signs of success or 
failure by the end of 1976, some aspects of the strategy should have raised a number of 
red flags at the time and did result in problems for Israeli policy in Lebanon as the civil 
war continued beyond the period discussed in this section. 
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The Israeli government principally employed indirect measures to support its 
NSA allies in central Lebanon, but relied more on direct methods in the south. The 
indirect approach to support the Maronites in central Lebanon was necessary politically 
to protect its allies and avoid heightening tensions with the Syrians. Initially those 
measures included covert political communications with the al-Assad government in 
order to gain guarantees of protection for the Christian community.149 Simultaneously 
Israeli pilot teams were meeting covertly with Maronite politicians and militia 
commanders in a deliberate operation to vet the Maronite NSAs in order to select viable 
partners. In the same month that the Syrians were staging their forces along the border, 
the Israeli government was already funneling weapons to its newfound Phalange militia 
allies north of Beirut.150 In the south, Israeli support of its Christian allies was far more 
direct. However, given the long established free reign of Israeli forces south of the Litani 
River by that time, the Israelis wasted little effort attempting to covertly provide support 
for their proxies there. This certainly contributed to a rising trend of antipathy toward the 
Israelis amongst southern Lebanese, given their years of exposure to repeated Israeli 
military operations into Lebanese territory to destroy the Palestinian resistance.  
Another sign of trouble to come for the Israelis was their development of a 
narrowly homogenous coalition. The Israeli strategy pursued an alliance with the 
Christian communities of Lebanon. In the north, that resulted with an alliance with the 
Maronites, principally by supporting the Phalange militia. The Phalange militia was 
formidable. Prior to the outbreak of the Civil War the Phalange had the most powerful 
militia in Lebanon.151 An uncomfortable reality for Israeli decision-makers was that the 
Phalange were modeled after the Nazi Party; Pierre Gemayel having been motivated by a 
1936 trip to Berlin to found his own fascist party in Lebanon.152 However, the Phalange 
demonstrated a willingness to go after the PLO and its multitude of factions operating 
within Lebanon. The Civil War started in April 1975 with fighting between the Phalange 
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and Palestinian militants and fighting between the communities continued intermittently 
since then. While the Israeli policy in central Lebanon built a strong relationship with an 
ally that shared their desire to fight the PLO, it also ignored a number of other factions 
that could have joined—or at least coordinated with an Israeli backed coalition. The 
Shiite community’s Amal militia is one such organization that could have served as a 
viable partner, given its confession’s anger toward the Palestinian militias and the near 
impunity with which they operated from Shiite parts of southern Lebanon. 
In southern Lebanon Israeli officials fostered the development of its own proxy 
militia force that again emphasized Christian ties over all others. Perhaps more so than 
the north, the south offered greater potential for a heterogonous coalition. In the south 
both the Christian and Shiite Lebanese community were frustrated with the PLO presence 
there. In a small sign of extending their hand beyond the Christian community, the Israeli 
government did extend “Open Fence” policy privileges to some Shiites.153 As the Israeli 
proxy militia developed in 1976, Israeli officials entrusted Major Saad Haddad, a 
Christian and paid officer in the Lebanese Army, to bring his army remnants and Israeli-
supported militia under his command.154 Haddad named his force the Army of Free 
Lebanon (AFL), and Israel intended to use it much like Syria used Saiqa.155 The 
successor to the AFL, the South Lebanese Army (SLA), claimed thirty percent of its 
members were Shiite and Druze in the 1980s.156 However, the AFL/SLA was always a 
majority Christian rank and file organization commanded by a Christian officer. Just as in 
central Lebanon, Israeli policy would favor a homogenous organization of Christians, 
leaving the rest of the confessions that it did not have a relationship with to align against 
its isolated allies. 
The Israeli government also favored organizations with a preference for violence. 
The Phalange militia helped kick off the Lebanese Civil War and continued to escalate 
the violence through its campaigns against Palestinians and then Muslims in general. In 
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January 1976 the Phalange was leading efforts by Christian militias to clear remaining 
Palestinian and Muslim sections of predominantly Maronite enclaves of Beirut.157 During 
one pilot team operation into central Lebanon where Israeli officials met with Maronite 
militiamen to include Pierre and Bashir Gemayel, the Christians asked for arms “so that 
they could slaughter the Palestinians.”158 While the militias forming in the south under 
Haddad did not yet show this preference for extreme violence, the warning signs for the 
Israelis were in the forefront even prior to their decision to support them in May 1976. 
The Israeli strategy in Lebanon had succeeded by the end of 1976 because the 
objective of reinforcing the status quo government was achieved by the Syrian 
intervention. The success was primarily due to the Rabin Administration’s willingness to 
accept the al-Assad government’s military intervention to reinforce the status quo. As a 
result of its decision to cooperate with its archrival, Israel did not have to leverage its 
limited influence over a narrowly homogenous coalition of NSA allies within Lebanon in 
order to pursue its objectives there. The challenges of Israel’s partner development within 
Lebanon would become more apparent as the war escalated following 1976. While the 
objective of reinforcing the status quo government in Beirut was accomplished, the 
Israeli government found its strategic position far weaker compared to the start of the 
war. First, Syria now had more influence than ever within Lebanon through an 
occupation legitimized by both the Lebanese government Israel favored as well as the 
Arab League. Second, the PLO had actually grown in strength as they operated freely in a 
buffer zone established by Israel’s red line policy toward Syria and with increased Syrian 
support following the Riyadh Agreement.159 Though Rabin saw his objective achieved 
by the end of 1976, the government’s decision to permit the Syrians to act unilaterally put 
Israel in a strategically weakened position versus its last remaining state rival in the Arab-
Israeli conflict. 
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D. COMPARISON OF STATE STRATEGIES 
1. Qualitative Analysis
The Syrian strategy in Lebanon from 1975 to 1976 proved more effective to that 
of Israel because the Syrians pursued a limited objective through a highly fluid 
combination of direct and indirect means to support a heterogonous coalition of both state 
and non-state actors. The Syrian government pursued a limited objective of reinforcing 
the existing Lebanese government with which they further developed preexisting political 
relationships in order to gain greater influence. The Israelis adopted the same policy 
objective in Lebanon as the Syrians, but by conceding to their state rival the freedom of 
maneuver to accomplish that objective for them, the Rabin administration found the 
Israeli strategic situation weakened at the conclusion of 1976. While both sides pursued 
similar limited objectives in Lebanon, Syria was better able to influence events on the 
ground due to its effective strategy. 
The al-Assad government favored the indirect approach as much as possible until 
resorting to direct intervention. But even while its troops occupied Lebanon, Syrian 
leadership continued to utilize indirect measures whenever possible. Following some 
hard lessons in June 1976, the Syrians adopted more indirect means by using proxies and 
allies in more populated areas while concentrating their conventional forces on the 
periphery of the country’s population centers where they could simultaneously cut off the 
logistics of its opponents while providing indirect fire and direct support to allies when 
necessary.160 The shift to a more indirect approach militarily weakened the coalition of 
revisionists and Palestinians arrayed against Syrian forces, even causing some units of the 
Lebanese Arab Army to defect by late summer.161 In contrast, Israeli officials continued 
to employ a very direct approach in southern Lebanon while in the north their methods 
were indirect out of necessity. In the south, Israeli forces repeatedly conducted raids 
against PLO targets in the years prior to the civil war.162 Disturbed by the increasing 
strength of the PLO in the south, the Israelis established their own indirect policing force 
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with the Army of Free Lebanon militia.163 The proxy force was largely ineffective on its 
own, and would soon be repeatedly reinforced by direct Israeli military intervention as 
the war continued beyond 1976. 
The Syrian government’s ability to develop a large heterogeneous coalition 
contributed significantly to their success by the end of this period. The al-Assad 
government’s Realpolitik strategy allowed Syrian commanders to develop a broad 
heterogonous coalition that included multiple homogenous NSAs and politicians. This 
policy was highly flexible and non-ideological, allowing Syrian leaders to switch 
alliances as necessary in order to accomplish their objectives on the ground. At any given 
time in this period Syria could claim allies in the Lebanese government, as well as 
militias from all three major confessions in Lebanon as well as Palestinians. The Israeli 
coalition was narrow and homogenous, leaving a sea of various militias outside their 
influence and free to align with the Syrians who were more practical in their deal making. 
The Syrian strategy also gained strong inroads into Lebanese politics, allowing 
the employment of non-violent techniques in combination with the violent techniques 
employed by its multiple militia partners. The Syrian government moderated multiple 
conflict mediations, and was able to bring parties to the table in part due to their strong 
connections to individuals and organizations on both sides of the conflict. Israel’s 
influence in contrast, ultimately relied on NSA’s with a preference for violence, due to 
the government’s lack of influence within the Lebanese political realm. 
The success of the Syrian strategy became apparent to the Israelis when at the end 
of 1976 they found their two most significant enemies in the Arab-Israeli conflict in a 
stronger position. Syria had gained control over much of Lebanon with both Lebanese 
government and Arab League political backing and logistical support.164 Following their 
renewed cooperation with Syria under the Riyadh Agreement, the PLO grew stronger 
than ever in southern Lebanon both militarily and politically as the Palestinian population 
became more dependent on their services due to the decline in Lebanese government 
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services during the war.165 Israel’s strategic position was far weaker at the end of 1976 
largely due to the Rabin administration’s decision to permit Syrian intervention in 
Lebanon. In response to the increased strength of its strategic rivals, the Israeli 
government would leverage its homogeneous NSA coalition to pursue its strategic 
interests within Lebanon as the war continued. 
2. Social Network Analysis  
A social network analysis of the 1976 organizational network of the Lebanese 
Civil War provides additional support to the conclusions drawn from the qualitative 
analysis of the previous section.166 As will be shown, by December 1976 the Syrian 
government had developed a large heterogonous coalition of multiple homogenous 
organizations across confessional lines, while the Israelis had built a narrow and 
homogenous coalition of Christian groups. The network consisted of twelve individuals 
and forty-two organizations. Figure 1 presents a visualization of the organizational 
network at the end of 1976. Node size varies by betweenness centrality, a measure that 
captures the extent to which an individual actor lies on the shortest path between all other 
pairs of actors in a network.167 The nodes are colored by type: States are colored green 
and NSAs are colored blue. The thickness of the ties between organizations reflects the 
un-scaled value of the relationship.168 Isolates were removed from this visualization. 
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Figure 1.  Lebanese Civil War Organizations Network 1976 
a. Network Topography 
The network topography measures of the standard network analysis are presented 
in Table 1. In 1976 the network consisted of 42 nodes and 87 directed ties. The 
characteristic path length (i.e., the average path distance between connected pairs of 
actors) was 11.915, which suggests a relatively distributed network. As we will see this 
remained relatively the same in 1983 but dropped considerably by 1990. Network density 
was 0.049, indicating that 4.9% of total possible ties existed. By 1990 network density 
doubled, but this may be misleading because density is sensitive to network size because 
as additional nodes join a network the number of potential ties grows exponentially. That 
is why analysts generally turn to average degree centrality (i.e., the average number of 
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ties per node) when comparing networks that differ in size, as we are here. In 1976 
average degree centrality was 17.69, and this will almost double to 30 by 1983 before 
dropping slightly in 1990 to approximately 27. In 1976 network cohesion, which 
measures the number of pairs of organizations that have either direct or indirect ties to 
one another, was 0.861, or 86.1%. This too increased over time; in fact, by 1990 every 
organization had a direct or indirect tie with one another. In 1976 the network was also 
quite hierarchical, as captured by Krackhardt’s measure of hierarchy (0.780, or 78%), 
which indicates that in 1976 the majority of relationships were directed rather than 
reciprocal. Indeed, the low reciprocity value of 0.076 (7.6%) indicates that only a small 
number of ties are reciprocal. 













Subgroup analysis was used in order to compare and contrast each state’s network 
influence. The results for clique analysis are presented in Table 2. Cliques are highly 
interconnected small subgroups of size three or greater in which every node is directly 
tied to one another. As the table indicates, fourteen cliques were identified. Of those, 
Syria was in six, while Israel was only in two, one of which consisted of a clique that 
included Syria, the United States, and Phalange. Syria’s membership in nearly half of all 
cliques is a strong indicator of the prestige the al-Assad regime had attained in the 
network by 1976. 
 42 
Table 2.   Clique Group Membership 
 
 
Newman group analysis was also used to identify important subgroups. Newman 
“subgroups are defined as having more ties within and fewer ties between groups than 
would be expected in a random graph of the same size with the same number of ties.”169 
In short, Newman group analysis seeks to determine whether any observed clustering is 
unlikely to have resulted from random interactions. Table 3 presents the results of the 
Newman group analysis. As it indicates eight total groups were detected, of which three 
are of particular interest. Although Syria was not assigned to the largest group, the group 
to which it was had the highest number of external links (15), which suggests it possessed 
a greater ability to influence other organizations outside of its group. Though Israel’s 
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group has fewer outside ties (6), its group is twice as dense as Syria’s, suggesting a high 
degree of cohesion among members of the group. 
Table 3.   Newman Group Membership 
 
 
c. Analysis of Individual Actors 
Table 4 presents several centrality measures that were estimated in order to 
compare the potential influence of Syria and Israel. As they indicate, Syria ranked first 
across all measures, and its scores were significantly higher than all of Israel’s. Its high 
betweenness centrality indicates the organization’s superior position of brokerage 
between other influential nodes. Its total degree centrality score of 0.066 indicates that 
the organization possessed the highest number of relationships in the network. The al-
Assad government’s superior in-degree and out-degree centrality scores indicate that the 
organization had the greatest number of both incoming and outgoing links, another 
indication of the state’s superior influence, and its top eigenvector, hub, and authority 
centrality scores provide additional evidence of its dominance at this time.170 The values 
and rankings shown on Table 4 add further quantitative support to the previous 
qualitative argument that the Syrian strategy was highly successful in building influence 
in Lebanon through a heterogeneous coalition of many homogenous organizations. 
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Table 4.   Actor Centrality Scores 
		 Syria	 Israel	
Measure	 Rank	 Value	 Rank	 Value	
Betweenness	Centrality	 1	 0.249	 12	 0.001	
Total	Degree	Centrality	 1	 0.066	 5	 0.018	
In-Degree	Centrality	 1	 0.083	 9	 0.014	
Out-Degree	Centrality	 1	 0.071	 3	 0.027	
Eigenvector	Centralitya	 1	 0.808	 16	 0.039	
Hub	Centralitya	 1	 0.832	 15	 0.033	
Authority	Centralitya	 1	 0.824	 16	 0.012	
a	Calculated	using UCINET 6.0.  
. 
d. SNA Conclusion 
The SNA of the Lebanese organizational network at the end of 1976 
quantitatively supports the qualitative thesis that Syria’s strategy to influence the 
Lebanese civil war environment proved more effective than that of Israel’s because the 
Syrians pursued a limited objective through a heterogeneous coalition of multiple 
homogenous NSAs supported by a combination of indirect and direct means. The 
subgroup analysis revealed that the Syrian government obtained membership in multiple 
influential subgroups, far more than its state rival. Additionally, a comparison of multiple 
node level measures revealed that Syria’s influence extended far beyond its clique and 
Newman groups, but throughout the network. In comparison, the Israeli government’s 
influence was far more limited beyond its small subgroup.  
E. CONCLUSION 
A combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses of the Lebanese Civil War 
in the period from 1975 to 1976 provides a useful comparison of state strategies to 
influence civil war environments through the support of NSAs. The Syrian government 
eventually decided to directly intervene in the civil war in the summer of 1976 as its NSA 
allies alone proved unable to stabilize the situation. However, following their direct 
intervention, the Syrians adhered to an overall strategy that emphasized indirect methods 
through a broad coalition in pursuit of a limited objective. Direct intervention by Syrian 
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forces typically only occurred where surrogates failed to secure al-Assad’s objectives. 
The Israeli government consented to its strategic rival’s direct intervention with the 
understanding that the al-Assad government shared their objective in Lebanon of 
reinforcing the status quo government. However, yielding control over the intrastate 
conflict almost entirely to its enemy, and failing to effectively prepare an NSA coalition 
on par with its rival’s, Israel was ill prepared for the new strategic situation that had 
elevated the status of both Syria and the PLO by the beginning of 1977. The Syrian and 
Israeli experience in Lebanon in the 1975 to 1976 period reinforces the value of adopting 
limited objectives, and pursuing those objectives through indirect and direct support to a 
broad coalition of NSA allies employing both violent and non-violent techniques. 
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IV. THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR: 1977–1983 
In June 1982 the Israeli government invaded Lebanon in order to destroy the 
PLO, install a pro-Israel Christian President in Beirut, and force the withdrawal of Syrian 
forces.171 Like the Syrians six years before, the Israelis sought dominance in Lebanon in 
order to secure their national interests. Whereas the international community cautiously 
accepted President al-Assad’s intervention in 1976, Prime Minister Begin’s campaign 
was widely condemned and drew a strong international response as Israeli forces entered 
the outskirts of Beirut. Despite diplomatic pressure, by the end of August 1982 the Israeli 
government was on its way to securing all of its objectives as the PLO withdrew from 
Beirut under the supervision of a western Multi-National Force (MNF), the Syrians were 
confined to the Bekaa Valley east of Beirut, and Israel-backed Bashir Gemayel was 
elected president under the influence of Israeli forces. However, Begin’s hopes for Israeli 
supremacy in Lebanon were crushed in September as President-elect Gemayel was 
assassinated and subsequent massacres by Gemayel’s Phalange militia permanently 
destroyed the legitimacy of Israel’s presence in Lebanon.172 Israeli forces gradually 
withdrew from central Lebanon, and in their place the Syrian government became more 
dominant in Lebanon than before the Israeli invasion.173 The 1982 invasion also hastened 
the arrival of another state actor whose Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 
would help local Lebanese Islamists establish a new militia through a small coalition of 
violent individuals and groups. 
A study of the June 1982 to December 1983 period of the Lebanese Civil War 
provides a valuable case study of three state actors and their efforts to influence a 
complex civil war environment because during this period a strategic shift occurs under 
direct Israeli intervention. The Israeli government pursued a limited objective of regime 
reinforcement through direct military intervention in support of a homogenous coalition 
of NSAs. The Syrian government continued to pursue its limited objective of regime 
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reinforcement through a combination of indirect and direct means in support of a broad 
heterogeneous coalition of NSAs and state allies. Upon their entrance into the war, the 
Iranians pursued an unlimited objective of regime overthrow through indirect support of a 
homogenous coalition of exceptionally violent NSAs. The following analysis will 
evaluate each strategy separately and then compare and assess the successes and failures 
of each. The analysis will focus on state objectives, their use of indirect and direct means, 
the composition of their allies in Lebanon, and the degree to which they employed violent 
and non-violent tactics. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 1977-1983 
From 1977 on the Lebanese Civil War became increasingly influenced by 
regional actors seeking influence in the conflict through their respective proxies.174 
While inter-communal warfare between Christians and Muslims still reflected much of 
the struggle, conflict resolution remained difficult due to the inability of any group to 
achieve victory, and external state support ensured weak NSAs continued to survive 
without a base of support.175 In this environment Syria dominated, continuing al-Assad’s 
Realpolitik strategy to ensure as much indirect control of the Lebanese landscape as 
possible. By 1978 the Syrians had formed a new coalition with its former enemies in the 
LNM, who joined a renewed Syrian-PLO alliance against Syria’s former allies of the 
Maronite status quo coalition.176 The Syrian alliance with the PLO, and the red lines 
enforced by the Israelis against Syrian forces entering south Lebanon, created an 
environment in which the Palestinians could build upon their state-within-a-state in 
Lebanon.177 Syrian dominance in Lebanon, the growing strength of the PLO, and 
domestic politics contributed to a movement to adopt interventionist policies within the 
Israeli government during the late 1970s. 
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As Syrian and PLO strength in Lebanon grew, a shift in Israeli politics ensured 
that the Israeli government adopted a pro-interventionist policy. The May 1977 Israeli 
elections brought Menachem Begin into power. Prime Minister Begin held a strong 
ideological affinity for the Maronite community of Lebanon, comparing their plight in 
Lebanon with the Jews in Europe.178 While the Rabin government had initiated the 
Maronite-Israeli alliance, Begin’s government would elevate it to a new level. In the 
south, the Israeli government built its SLA proxy force under the command of Major 
Haddad, often conducting ground operations to attack PLO positions and reinforce SLA 
control in the area.179 In central Lebanon, the Rabin government increased support to 
Bashir Gemayel, assisting his successful campaign to consolidate Phalange control over 
the Maronite militias under the banner of the Lebanese Forces by 1980.180   
In March 1978, following a Fatah raid into northern Israel, Rabin launched 
Operation Litani to destroy PLO infrastructure and establish a ten kilometer wide security 
zone inside Lebanon.181 Due to a weather delay, the Palestinians had advance knowledge 
of the operation and were mostly north of the Israeli operational area as the operation 
began.182 The only tangible benefit from the operation for the Israeli government was the 
deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to southern 
Lebanon as a buffer between Israeli and Palestinian forces.183 However, the Rabin 
government learned two critical lessons from Operational Litani that would influence its 
policy toward Lebanon. First, the Israelis learned that an operation to destroy the PLO 
must extend beyond southern Lebanon, and second, only a resolution to Lebanon’s 
political instability could permanently eliminate the influence of the Palestinians there.184 
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Before the Begin government could apply these lessons in the final campaign to destroy 
the PLO, they needed to make further political gains domestically.  
In the June 1981 elections, Begin’s Likud-led coalition won more seats, and as a 
result, they replaced anti-interventionist cabinet members with pro-interventionist ones, 
giving the administration far greater power in crafting an interventionist policy toward 
Lebanon.185 Frustrated with their inability to defeat the PLO through incursions, air 
strikes, and proxy forces, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon began planning for the invasion 
of Lebanon from his first day in office.186 Despite the unprecedented calm along the 
Israel-Lebanon border in the year leading up to the invasion, the IDF launched Operation 
Peace for Galilee in June 1982.187 
Israel had advanced to Beirut by mid-June 1982, despite repeated claims that the 
IDF would advance only 25 miles into Lebanon. As August 1982 came to an end, Israel 
had secured the withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon under international observation, 
Bashir Gemayel was elected President under strong Israeli influence, and Syria was 
confined to the mountains east of Beirut and the Bekaa Valley. Syria adopted a war of 
attrition strategy against Israel, employing proxies to fight Israeli and international forces 
in order to force their withdrawal from Lebanon.188 In September 1982 Syrian proxies 
assassinated President-elect Bashir Gemayel.189 In the following days, Gemayel’s 
Phalange militia massacred Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in 
Beirut, for which an Israeli government commission would find Israeli officials, to 
include Ariel Sharon, indirectly responsible.190 The IDF slowly retreated south into the 
security zone where its forces would remain for the rest of the war, while al-Assad’s 
coalition of NSAs reestablished Syrian influence over the country. Following Israeli 
withdrawal from the Beirut region, the Phalange fought on largely alone, and its ties with 
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Israel were broken by 1983.191 Assisted by their newfound Iranian allies, the Syrians 
continued the war of attrition against the IDF and its last remaining Lebanese ally, the 
SLA, long beyond December 1983. 
B. ISRAELI STRATEGY 
1. Objective 
The Begin government invaded Lebanon in 1982 with three major war aims: to 
reinforce Christian dominance under the status quo confessional system in order to gain a 
Lebanon-Israel peace agreement, to destroy the PLO, and to force the Syrians to 
withdraw.192 The Israeli objective of regime reinforcement is not to be confused with 
regime overthrow. The Begin government planned to ensure the election of Bashir 
Gemayel to the presidency within the current governmental structure of Lebanon. In 
November 1981 Gemayel officially declared his intention to run for President Sarkis’s 
position at the conclusion of his term in September 1982, but understood that his 
candidacy would only succeed with Israeli intervention.193 Once Gemayel was in power, 
Begin hoped, he would sign a peace agreement with Israel, making Lebanon the second 
Arab country to do so, and setting the conditions for the permanent removal of the PLO 
from Lebanon.194 Begin’s policy in Lebanon directly supported his government’s long-
term plans to annex the West Bank and Gaza into “Greater Israel.”195 By breaking the 
Palestinian resistance in Lebanon and dominating the region upon the successful 
conclusion of the war, the Begin government believed they could have unchallenged 
control of the Palestinian territories.196 In June 1982 the Israeli government invaded 
Lebanon in pursuit of a limited objective of regime reinforcement through nearly 
unlimited and direct means. 
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2. Allied Agents in Lebanon 
Israel did not have political allies in the Lebanese government during the lead up 
to the June invasion, but the invasion implanted their long-time ally into the presidency. 
The invasion set the conditions for Bashir Gemayel’s election to the presidency in August 
1982, thus enshrining Begin’s most important ally in Lebanon with the perceived 
legitimacy of the presidential office. In reality, his election by the participating members 
of the Lebanese government was heavily influenced by the Israelis as some votes were 
bought for a reported half a million dollars and other officials were transported to the 
election by the IDF.197 Despite investing an incredible amount of blood and treasure to 
emplace Gemayel in power, he and his affiliated militia forces were far from reliable 
allies for the Israeli government. 
Bashir Gemayel and his Maronite militia signaled to the Israeli government on 
numerous occasions that they would not act as an Israeli-proxy in Lebanon, and the 
Israeli government was divided over Begin and Sharon’s proposals. Sharon developed a 
personal relationship with Gemayel, and placed a strategic value on the Israel-Phalange 
alliance despite reservations from Israeli intelligence.198 IDF intelligence warned that 
Bashir Gemayel was only using the Israelis to secure political power, and once in place, 
he would move Lebanon closer to the Arab world and away from Israel.199 Though 
Gemayel never actually held political office due to his assassination, there were multiple 
events that validated the IDF’s intelligence estimate. During the invasion he refused to 
attack the PLO in support of the IDF, and following his election he declared his intent to 
pursue neutrality toward Israel and Syria.200 At a meeting between Begin, Sharon, and 
Gemayel on 1 September 1982, the President-elect indicated that he would act 
independently of Israel on a number of matters, which infuriated Begin and resulted in 
the meeting ending abruptly following a shouting match.201 The alliance continued 
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however, and prior to his assassination on 14 September 1982 the two sides had agreed 
on a plan to clear the remaining Palestinians resistance from west Beirut and following 
that, to sign a peace treaty within the next month.202 
The death of Bashir Gemayel destroyed the central pillar of the Begin 
government’s strategy for Lebanon, the establishment of a friendly government in Beirut. 
The Israelis backed President Sarkis to assume the presidency, ironically the Syrian-
backed president of Lebanon since 1976, but instead Bashir’s brother Amin won the 
election.203 Amin Gemayel was more political than his brother, abstaining from 
involvement in the Maronite militias his brother commanded, and because of his political 
focus he maintained links with the Muslim community since the inception of the war.204 
President Amin Gemayel did sign a treaty with Israel on 17 May 1983, under which the 
Israelis agreed to withdraw their forces to the south, but the agreement was largely 
engineered through American diplomatic efforts rather than Israeli influence with 
Amin.205 In early 1984 President al-Assad rolled out the red carpet for President 
Gemayel during an official visit to Damascus, thus signaling the degree to which the 
Lebanese government had swung back into Syrian orbit.206 By the end of 1983 the 
Israelis had no political allies within the Beirut government.  
Israel’s NSA allies in Lebanon through this period consisted of the Lebanese 
Forces (LF) and Israel’s proxy, the SLA. The Lebanese Forces were composed primarily 
of Bashir Gemayel’s Phalange militia, which had consolidated the major Maronite 
militias under his command during the course of a violent campaign from 1978 to 
1980.207 By 1982, the LF claimed over eight thousand militiamen.208 The degree to 
which the LF were willing to employ violence against their own community and others 
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was not exceptional in the Lebanese civil war landscape, but Israeli officials did caution 
the LF to restrain themselves during the 1982 invasion.209 The Israelis coordinated with 
the LF to conduct a clearance of the Palestinian refugee camps of fighters prior to Bashir 
Gemayel’s death, and following his assassination the operation commenced hastily, 
resulting in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camp massacre.210 Once the massacre became 
public, the Phalange, the bulk of the militia forces responsible for it under the LF, blamed 
the attack on Israel’s other critical NSA ally in Lebanon, the SLA, in an effort to shift 
responsibility for the atrocity onto the Israelis and their proxy.211 
The SLA was an Israel-backed proxy force that operated across southern Lebanon 
to secure the area for the IDF. The SLA was never sufficient to secure the border zone 
without significant Israeli direct support.212 They usually claimed around two thousand 
militiamen under their command.213 Backed up by the IDF, they controlled an area of 
five hundred square miles and one hundred thousand mostly Christians as many Muslims 
fled the area.214 The SLA’s commander since its inception, Major Haddad, died in 
December 1983 of cancer, yet another loss of an important leader in Israel’s narrow 
Lebanese coalition during this period.215 The SLA and Phalange maintained ties in the 
years prior to the Israeli invasion, but as demonstrated by the willingness of the Phalange 
to blame them for the Sabra and Shatilla massacre, their ties were clearly strained by the 
fall of 1982. 
3. Methods of Supporting Allies 
The Israeli government provided political, logistical, and direct military support to 
its allies in Lebanon through a combination of direct and indirect means. Prior to the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon its political support for its LF allies was principally indirect 
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while in the south political support to its SLA allies was direct. Israel’s support of Bashir 
Gemayel and his Maronite coalition came principally through broad political statements 
referencing Israel’s interest in protecting the Lebanese Maronite community. As early as 
1978, the Begin administration had publicly declared its obligation to prevent the 
genocide of Lebanese Christians, as the IDF conducted over flights of Syrian forces in 
Lebanon and increased its ground forces in the Golan Heights in order to force a cease-
fire between Syrian and Phalange forces.216 On 3 June 1981, speaking in front of the 
Knesset, Begin pledged to come to the defense of Lebanese Christians if attacked by the 
Syrian air force, declaring the survival of the Christian community in Lebanon a vital 
Israeli interest.217 Repeated declarations by the Israelis to come to the aid of the Christian 
community in Lebanon provided essential political support to Bashir Gemayel’s militia 
as they repeatedly challenged Syrian authority in the years leading up to the Israeli 
invasion. In order to ensure Bashir Gemayel received the vote in the August 1982 
election, the Israelis supported him by buying votes and physically escorting some 
delegates to the election.218 With Bashir in place, the Israelis looked forward to the peace 
agreement that would politically legitimize its efforts in Lebanon permanently, but 
Bashir’s assassination brought about the collapse of Begin’s political designs in Beirut. 
The Israeli government also provided strong and direct political support to its 
SLA proxy militia. In April 1979 MAJ Haddad declared the south an independent 
Christian enclave, and in response the government officially discharged Haddad and 
those in his command from the Lebanese Army.219 The Begin government continued 
their political support of the SLA, reinforcing Haddad’s efforts to establish governance 
and collect taxes in the south.220 Under the 17 May 1983 Israel-Lebanon treaty, the 
Israelis sought and gained the Amin Gemayel government’s agreement to incorporate the 
SLA into the Lebanese Army, thus achieving recognition of its proxy force as a 
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legitimate government force.221 However, the political recognition of the SLA dissolved 
with the abrogation of the 17 May agreement in the spring of 1984. 
Israeli logistical support for their SLA and LF allies was significant. In the lead 
up to the 1982 invasion the Israelis estimated their yearly contributions to the LF at $25 
million.222 In addition to Israeli support, the LF received $10 million a year in support 
from the Reagan administration at that time.223 Between 1977 and 1982 the Rabin 
government sold more than $118 million of arms to the LF and SLA.224 Following the 
Israeli invasion, in the spring of 1983 the Israelis were supporting the SLA by collecting 
taxes for their funding.225 The “good fence” policy of 1976 continued in the south, 
providing Christians the opportunity to conduct commerce and work in Israel and some 
villages received electricity and water from Israel.226 The Israeli government provided 
significant logistical support to its NSA allies in Lebanon, but the SLA, positioned along 
the Israeli border, and essential to the Rabin government’s border security plan, received 
the most comprehensive support. 
While the Israeli direct military support for both of its NSA allies in Lebanon was 
significant in June 1982 as thousands of IDF soldiers invaded Lebanon, prior to the 
invasion Israel provided direct support to both NSAs. Prior to and after the invasion, the 
IDF repeatedly supported the SLA, and the two often conducted combined operations 
together. The Israeli government only occasionally provided direct military support to the 
Phalange in central Lebanon in the years prior to the invasion. In one battle between 
Phalange and Syrian forces in April 1981, the IDF shot down two Syrian helicopters.227 
Both forces received military training in Israeli territory. Between 1978 and 1982 the 
Israelis trained 1,250 Lebanese officers at a facility in the Negev desert.228 Following the 
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Israeli invasion the IDF supported the Phalange directly across central Lebanon, but that 
support dwindled as the Israeli government gradually withdrew their forces back to the 
south by the end of 1983. In July 1983 for instance, Christian forces fighting Druze in the 
Shouf did not receive any support from IDF units stationed nearby.229 
4. Assessment of Strategy 
In 1982 the Israeli government pursued a limited objective by providing direct 
military support to a homogeneous coalition of Christian militias. While Begin sought to 
replace the Lebanese president through the election of his own Lebanese political ally, he 
did not seek the complete overthrow of the entire Lebanese political system. In fact, the 
Begin government wanted to ensure that the confessional system underlying the 
distribution of power in Lebanon remained in place as it benefited the Christians over all 
the other confessions. However, the Israeli strategy produced nothing short of a political 
and military defeat for Israel. In the years following 1982 the policy produced four major 
failures: in military defeat in Lebanon the PLO moderated under Yasser Arafat thus 
further compromising Begin’s Likud Party’s plans for the West Bank, Syrian dominance 
of Lebanon became stronger than the pre-1982 era, the Christians were weakened rather 
than strengthened by the campaign, and the PLO militants were replaced by the more 
radical Hezbollah.230 In the year following the invasion, Defense Minister Sharon was 
removed and Prime Minister Begin resigned voluntarily but did not publicly specify his 
reasons for doing so.231 Part of Israel’s failure in Lebanon can be attributed to its strategy 
of support for a homogeneous Christian coalition. 
The Israeli government’s emphasis on direct methods rather than indirect put 
great strain not only on its own forces but also on its NSA allies. While Bashir Gemayel 
and his Maronite coalition repeatedly requested Israeli intervention prior to the invasion, 
the direct intervention by the Israeli government in an Arab state’s internal political 
affairs came with great cost. Prior to his death, Bashir Gemayel did demonstrate a 
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comprehension of the degree to which direct Israeli political support could undermine his 
political future in Lebanon. In January 1982, during a meeting between Sharon, Bashir 
and his father Pierre, Pierre Gemayel guffawed at Sharon’s suggestion that Lebanon sign 
a peace agreement with Israel, proclaiming that they were not traitors.232 Bashir knew he 
would have to tread carefully following his election in order to create distance between 
himself and Israel while still receiving their support. In a meeting with the Israelis on the 
evening of his election, Bashir said he would pursue a more neutral path going forward, 
which meant a pro-Syrian position to the Israelis.233 Following Bashir’s death, Begin had 
no other legitimate politician with which he could replace Bashir. Israeli officials’ 
preference for direct methods also undermined their efforts to build support from other 
confessions within Lebanon, though those efforts to go outside the Maronite alliance 
were limited in the first place. 
Israel’s strategy of direct support of a Maronite coalition pitted virtually every 
other faction in Lebanon against it. In the south, the Israelis had a brief window of 
opportunity to align with the only major Shiite militia in Lebanon in 1982, the secular 
Amal. Israel and Amal shared the same enemy, the PLO, and Amal assisted Israeli efforts 
against the organization in 1982.234 However, Israel did not attempt to align with Amal, 
and instead focused on recruiting Shia into its SLA proxy.235 On 16 October 1983 an 
Israeli patrol blundered into an Ashura procession, incurring a violent exchange resulting 
in the death of two Lebanese.236 The incident mobilized the Shiite community against 
Israel, the few Shiite militias within the Israeli proxy force deserted, and Amal joined a 
growing umbrella of Islamist groups fighting Israeli occupation of the south.237 As Israeli 
ties to the Phalange came under strain in late 1982, the Israelis reached out to the Druze 
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PSP, but were rebuffed.238 Strained ties gave way to a complete divestment of the Israeli-
Phalange alliance by 1983.239 At the end of 1983, the Israeli government’s last remaining 
ally in Lebanon was its SLA proxy force, confined to a narrow security zone in south 
Lebanon. 
The loss of the Begin government’s only legitimate political ally in September 
1982, forced Israel to rely increasingly on violent NSAs in a far bleaker campaign to gain 
influence in the Lebanese civil war environment by force. The pitfalls of a coalition 
dependent upon violent NSAs became apparent in the days following Bashir Gemayel’s 
death as his Phalange militia killed thousands of Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatilla 
refugee camps. The massacre actually had far greater impact on Israeli policy due to the 
domestic response rather than that of the Lebanese. The reformist camp of Syria, Muslim, 
and PLO groups were quick to blame the IDF and SLA for the massacre and reconcile 
with the Phalange in order to avoid continued fighting and ensure presidential succession 
under their terms.240 The reports of the massacre, and the implication that the IDF may 
have been involved, kicked off the largest demonstration in Israeli history in Tel Aviv, 
launching a government commission of inquiry, and eventually bringing about the 
political downfall of those most responsible for the war.241 After the murder of Israel’s 
only significant political ally in Lebanon in September 1982, the Sabra and Shatilla 
massacre signaled the challenges of maintaining influence in the civil war environment 
through violent NSAs alone. 
In 1982 Israel pursued a limited objective of regime reinforcement through direct 
means in support of a homogeneous coalition of Christian militias. Even before 1983 
began, the Israeli policy was a failure. The Israeli objectives of establishing a pro-Israel 
government in Beirut, forcing Syrian withdrawal, and destruction of the PLO were only 
temporarily accomplished. By the end of 1983 the government in Beirut had again 
become pro-Syrian, as the Syrian forces were again expanding their presence in the 
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country, and while the PLO headquarters and thousands of fighters had withdrawn to 
Tunisia and other countries, they would be back. Israel’s influence would never extend 
beyond the security zone in southern Lebanon after 1983 for the duration of the civil war. 
C. SYRIAN STRATEGY  
1. Objective 
Syria’s limited objective during the Israeli intervention remained the 
reinforcement of a pro-Syrian regime in Beirut in order to ensure Syrian influence 
throughout the country. Al-Assad’s objective would secure two important national 
interests for Syria. First, Syria’s presence in Lebanon would help promote stability and 
reduce the chances of the conflict spreading to Syrian territory.242 Second, al-Assad 
hoped to create a counterbalance to Israeli power in the Arab-Israeli conflict in the wake 
of the loss of Egypt by asserting its influence over “Greater Syria,” which included 
Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians.243 While the objective remained the same, the 
Syrians had to adapt their strategy against Israel and the foreign forces that had inserted 
themselves into the conflict. The Syrian government adopted a war of attrition through 
proxy in order to drive the IDF and MNF from Lebanon.244 The employment of proxy 
forces was critical to the Syrian strategy as the country was not strong enough to fight 
alone against the Israelis or the MNF. 
2. Allied Agents in Lebanon 
The Syrian government maintained ties to a number of state-level politicians and 
multiple NSAs through the Israeli intervention period. Prior to the Israeli invasion, 
Syrian-backed Elias Sarkis held the presidency since his 1976 election. The Syrians 
supported Sarkis because despite being a Christian, he was a political reformer, who held 
no communal leadership position and was not affiliated with any militias, and as a result 
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he was dependent on Syrian support.245 While the Israeli intervention successfully 
removed Sarkis from power when Bashir Gemayel was elected, the Syrians acted quickly 
to prevent the Israeli-backed militia commander from assuming the presidency. On 14 
September 1982, a Syrian agent assassinated Bashir Gemayel with a remote controlled 
bomb.246 At the time the identity of the perpetrators was unknown, but some suspected a 
rival Christian clan of the attack.247 By the end of September Amin Gemayel, Bashir’s 
brother, was elected president with the blessing of Muslim and Syrian leadership due to 
his moderate political record toward the other confessions.248 As the Israelis withdrew 
from Beirut in 1982, the struggling Lebanese Army continued to decline into 1983, and 
as the MNF prepared for departure at the end of 1983, Amin Gemayel was pulled into al-
Assad’s influence.249 Over time Amin became al-Assad’s man in Beirut.250 
Al-Assad’s NSA coalition was large before the Israeli invasion, and increased in 
the aftermath. In the years since its intervention to support the status quo Christian groups 
in 1976, Syria had realigned with the reformist coalition as status quo resistance against 
Syrian occupation grew. The most significant NSAs cooperating with Syria in the pre-
Israeli invasion period were the Druze PSP at 3,000 fighters, and Shiite Amal, which 
claimed 30,000 fighters in 1982.251 The Syrians also maintained their Palestinian proxy 
forces in the PLA and Saiqa, each of which numbered in the low thousands. Syrian 
relations with the PLO were under severe strain prior to the Israeli invasion, as al-Assad 
suspected that Arafat was supporting Islamist rebels fighting the Alawi government.252 
During the siege of west Beirut by Israeli forces from June to August 1982, Syrian and 
Palestinian forces trapped there fought together, but outside of that localized conflict the 
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PLO was largely alone in its fight against the Israelis during 1982.253 As the PLO 
command left Lebanon in 1982, al-Assad encouraged a rebellion within Arafat’s own 
Fatah organization in order to gain further Syrian influence over the PLO coalition.254 In 
the summer of 1982 the Iranians, with Syrian support, began working with Islamist 
groups in the Bekaa valley in order to establish a front for Islamic revolution in Lebanon 
and to fight the Israeli occupation.255 By the end of the 1983 al-Assad had increased his 
coalition of NSA and state allies in Lebanon, gaining greater influence over Lebanon than 
existed prior to the Israeli invasion. 
3. Methods of Supporting Allies 
The Syrian government supported its allies in Lebanon politically, logistically, 
and through indirect military support in the post-Israeli invasion period. The Israeli 
invasion and dominance of Beirut, and subsequent international intervention led by the 
United States, temporary limited the degree to which al-Assad could provide political 
support to his allies in Lebanon. Within the first week of the Israeli invasion, al-Assad’s 
forces had to first secure their own survival following the destruction of their air defense 
network in the Bekaa Valley, and fighting off an Israeli advance to cut the Beirut-
Damascus highway in central Lebanon. When the Americans brokered an Israel-Syria 
cease-fire on 11 June 1982, the Syrians accepted while the Israelis felt cheated out of 
victory over the Syrian forces.256 During Israel’s siege of west Beirut in the summer of 
1982, Syria and the PLO worked through the Arab League to negotiate the departure of 
their forces from the city in August.257 The Syrian assassination of president-elect Bashir 
Gemayel undercut Israel’s political gains, and the election of Amin Gemayel represented 
a political victory for Syria’s reformist allies in Beirut only a month after the last Syrian 
forces were forced to withdraw from the city. In response to Gemayel’s acceptance of the 
17 May 1983 agreement with Israel, al-Assad encouraged PSP leader Walid Jumblatt to 
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form a National Salvation Front (NSF) of reformist groups opposed to the government’s 
agreement.258 The NSF was a powerful coalition of Lebanese political and militia leaders 
that included Nabih Berri from Amal, Walid Jumblatt from the PSP, former Prime 
Minister Karami, and former President Franjiah, a prominent Christian politician who 
also controlled a militia.259 Through 1983, al-Assad and his proxies continued to harass 
the Israeli forces and MNF in Beirut through direct and indirect fire, and suicide 
bombings that forced the withdrawal of the entire MNF by early 1984, thus reopening the 
political landscape to overt Syrian influence. 
As the Syrian army recovered in the Bekaa Valley following its retreat from 
Beirut, the Syrians and their newfound Iranian allies provided significant logistical and 
indirect military support to their proxies and allies carrying out their attrition campaign 
against the MNF and Israeli forces. The Islamists gathering in the Bekaa Valley 
following the Israeli invasion were provided safe haven, financing, weapons, military 
training, and intelligence from the Syrian government.260 In May 1983 Syria began 
providing both weapons and direct military support to the PSP fighting in the mountains 
east of Beirut against the LF.261 Those PLO forces that rebelled against Arafat’s 
leadership following their evacuation from Beirut were extended support from al-Assad 
while those that remained loyal were cornered in Tripoli by Syrian-backed Baathists 
supported by Syrian artillery, eventually agreeing to retreat to Tunis via French escort.262 
As per al-Assad’s Realpolitik policy, those Lebanese NSAs that agreed to ally with the 
Syrian government were soon rewarded with logistical and military support. 
4. Assessment of Strategy 
Following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, the Syrian government successfully 
accomplished its limited objective of regime reinforcement primarily through a 
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heterogeneous coalition of NSA and state allies supported by both direct and indirect 
means. The Syrian government’s assassination of Israel’s only hope of political success, 
and the subsequent massacres of Palestinians by Israeli-supported militias, led to the 
collapse of domestic support for the conflict and subsequent withdrawal of Israel from 
much of Lebanon under international pressure by September 1983.263 Syrian-backed 
Amal and PSP militia actions against Gemayel’s struggling Lebanese Army brought his 
government into Syrian orbit, and simultaneously convinced the MNF to begin planning 
for their exit from Beirut.264 The Syrian indirect attrition strategy through proxy forces 
enabled al-Assad to return Syrian influence to most of Lebanon by the end of 1983. 
The Syrian government’s influence over a broad coalition of NSAs enabled al-
Assad to pressure his enemies in Lebanon indirectly from multiple locations. Incapable of 
confronting either Israel or the MNF directly in the post-Israeli invasion period, the 
Syrians employed surrogate forces to conduct a war of attrition against their enemies in 
Lebanon.265 Syria’s indirect methods provided al-Assad a degree of deniability, 
preserved his military strength, and effectively eroded the morale of his enemy’s soldiers 
and citizens. In part due to their campaign in Lebanon, Islamist insurgents challenged the 
al-Assad government domestically, but the authoritarian government was able to stay the 
course in Lebanon unlike the democratically elected government of Israel.266 By 
reasserting its influence in Lebanon and subsequently over the Palestinians, and confining 
the Israelis to the security zone in the south, al-Assad had accomplished a critical piece of 
his grand strategy to establish a “Greater Syria” alliance against Israel. 
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D. IRANIAN STRATEGY 
1. Objective 
The Iranian government entered Lebanon in the summer of 1982 with the 
unlimited objective of regime overthrow in order to establish another Islamic regime in 
its own image.267 Lebanon offered the Iranian government the best prospect to spread 
Islamic revolution and to confront Israel and the United States.268 During the period of 
Israeli intervention, Iranian foreign policy focused on spreading Islamic revolution and 
establishing contacts with the Third World while maintaining neutrality toward the 
superpowers.269 By inserting its forces into Lebanon with Syrian approval, the Iranians 
not only sought to develop their own Islamic resistance there, but also to extend support 
to the Palestinian cause in order to undermine the development of a unified Arab bloc in 
support of Iraq against Iran.270 The fact that Iranian and Syria objectives for Lebanon 
were directly opposed was less important than the high value each government placed on 
their alliance. For Syria, Iran provided a valuable ally against both Iraq and Israel.271 For 
the Iranians, having an Arab ally reduce the Arab-Persian dynamic of the Iran-Iraq war, 
and Syria facilitated direct access to Lebanon where a large Shia population offered the 
potential mass base with which to foment Islamic revolution.272 With these objectives, 
the IRGC entered the Bekaa Valley in June 1982 in order to build an Islamic 
revolutionary movement to overthrow the Lebanese government. 
2. Allied Agents in Lebanon  
 Iranian Lebanese allies from 1982 to 1983 were solely NSAs—though the 
government could exert limited influence on Lebanese officials through Syrian channels. 
It must be noted how vital Syria was to Iranian actions in this period. Two days after the 
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Israeli invasion, an Iranian delegation led by their defense minister reached an agreement 
with the al-Assad government whereby the IRGC would begin an Islamic resistance 
movement in Lebanon with al-Assad’s blessing in exchange for Iranian oil.273 The 
Iranians set about building a Shia based Islamic resistance with a coalition of breakaway 
factions, prominent Islamists leaders (many of whom were long-time friends of the 
Iranian revolutionary leaders), and recruits from the multitude of factions fighting across 
Lebanon.274 In August 1982 Ayatollah Khomeini met with members of the Lebanese 
Shiite ulama and urged them to return to Lebanon and fight the Israeli occupation.275  
Husayn al-Musawi’s Islamic Amal established the core of the IRGC coalition 
taking shape in the Bekaa in 1982. Inspired by the Iranian revolution, and dissatisfied 
with Amal leader Nabih Berri’s secular ideology, Musawi broke away from Amal just 
one month prior to the Israeli invasion, bringing many prominent Islamists with him to 
the Bekaa Valley.276 The Iranians also benefited from close personal ties between 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s clerics and the Lebanese Shia clerics, many of whom attended the 
same religious schools in Najaf, Iraq or Qom, Iran.277 The IRGC, Islamic Amal, and 
other NSAs built an Islamic resistance coalition that slowly spread across the Shiite 
community in Lebanon, fueled by growing anger toward the Israeli occupation. The 
coalition did not officially adopt the name Hezbollah, or Party of God, until early 
1984.278 
The other significant ally for the Khomeini government in this period was Yasser 
Arafat’s PLO. In 1972 Ayatollah Khomeini and Arafat signed an agreement under which 
Fatah would train Iranian revolutionaries in its camps in south Lebanon.279 Many of the 
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Iranian revolutionaries received training from Arafat’s Fatah in Lebanon during the 
1970s, to include Mohsen Rafiqdost, who assumed command of the IRGC in 1982.280 
During the Iranian Revolution Arafat ordered Fatah to “provide ‘any assistance’ 
requested to ‘protect’ the Iranian revolution,” placing his entire network at the disposal of 
Khomeini and his followers.281 Following the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini 
handed Yasser Arafat the keys to the former Israeli embassy in Tehran.282 While the 
Iranian resistance network was not capable of extending support to the Palestinians in the 
summer of 1982, by 1983 its forces were capable of conducting terror attacks against 
targets with strategic implications. 
While the IRGC fully embraced the Islamic Amal offshoot, and many individual 
defectors from Amal itself throughout the period, the Iranians distanced themselves from 
Amal for a variety of reasons. Amal’s secular ideology under Nabih Berri conflicted with 
the Iranian Islamists’ designs, and Berri’s willingness to cooperate with other 
confessional groups through the National Salvation Front increased the ideological divide 
between the two groups.283 Amal’s leadership did not share the Iranians affinity for the 
PLO, and saw the Palestinians as a threat to traditional Shiite homelands in south 
Lebanon and Beirut.284 When Amal did reach out to the Iranians in 1982, they told Amal 
leadership that they would have to work under their terms.285 While the Iranians rejected 
an alliance with Amal, their coalition’s growth was made possible by Amal’s years of 
organizational development of the Shiite community and the Iranian coalition grew on 
top of Amal’s infrastructure.286 
A final organization that warrants mention is the Islamic Jihad Organization 
(IJO). IJO was established under great secrecy in 1982 under the direction of Sheikh 
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Hossein, an ethnically Arab IRGC officer with wide ranging authorities.287 Sheikh 
Hossein recruited Imad Mughniyah, a Lebanese Shia with years of experience in the 
Islamist wing of Fatah.288 The Iranians provided Mughniyah a commission in the IRGC, 
and ample resources with which to development a terrorist organization largely by 
recruiting old friends from his PLO days.289 Mughniyah’s network shared strong familial, 
organizational, and geographic ties, the combination of which made the IJO extremely 
difficult to crack due to the high degree of mutual trust.290 The Syrians were left in the 
dark, and only a handful of other IRGC officers were aware of an operational command 
that extended from the Ayatollah himself through Hossein to the IJO.291 The IJO was the 
conduit for the transfer of Iranian martyrdom operations to Lebanon, conducting their 
first suicide attack on the IDF headquarters in Tyre on 11 November 1982.292 They 
executed the U.S. embassy bombing in Beirut in April 1983 and the barracks bombings 
of the French and U.S. Marines in October 1983.293 The bombings were a major 
contributing factor in the Reagan administration’s decision to withdraw the Marines in 
February 1984.294 Through IJO, the Iranians were able to establish a degree of deniability 
to its Islamist coalition of resistance forces being established in the Bekaa Valley during 
this period. 
3. Methods of Supporting Allies 
Khomeini’s government supported their NSA allies in Lebanon primarily through 
logistical and military indirect support, and political support through its alliance with the 
al-Assad government. The Iranian government’s close alliance with the al-Assad 
government granted the Iranian coalition the safe haven within the Bekaa Valley in which 
                                                
287 Baer, The Devil We Know, 62–64. 
288 Blanford, Warriors of God, 46. 
289 Baer, The Devil We Know, 62–65. 
290 Baer, See No Evil, 114. 
291 Baer, The Devil We Know, 64–65. 
292 Ibid., 214. 
293 Fisk, Pity the Nation, 520. 
294 Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 376. 
 69 
to develop their resistance force. Syrian political support also facilitated a stream of 
Iranian logistical support to flow across the border. Iranian financing of the Islamic 
resistance was in the area of $100 million annually during this period.295 Demonstrating 
the investment the Iranian government was making in Lebanon at the time, their embassy 
in Damascus, from which much of its assistance to its NSA allies was filtered, had an 
estimated operating budget of $400 million annually and a staff of 200.296 
In addition to significant logistical support, the Iranian government developed its 
Islamic coalition in the Bekaa through its revolutionary vanguards, the IRGC. In the 
weeks following the invasion, 1500 IRGC guards established a training center near 
Baalbek in the Bekaa Valley.297 Some of the Iranian advisors were from Iran’s 
predominantly Arab Khuzestan Province, and spoke Arabic fluently.298 Contrary to the 
other state actors thus far, the Iranians were far more patient in their approach. Initially 
the IRGC focused on spreading their ideology amongst the local Shiite population around 
Baalbek, providing religious classes and showing propaganda films.299 Resistance 
volunteers had to apply in writing and possess a reference from two Shia clerics, and 
sometimes waited up to six months for approval to attend a training course.300 The first 
two training courses were run by IRGC advisors and trained 150 recruits for a couple 
months.301 Starting with the third iteration of the course the Lebanese cadres became the 
trainers, and the Iranians taught the more advanced skills, sending promising recruits to 
Iran for three-month advanced courses.302 Through this train-the-trainer model the 
Iranians were able to develop a sufficiently sized force to compete for influence in the 
civil war. While the resistance forces were being developed in 1982, the Iranians were 
able to conduct an effective terror campaign against Israeli and MNF forces through a 
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proxy terrorist organization, ensuring their NSA coalition in the Bekaa plausible 
deniability while it grew in numbers. 
4. Assessment of Strategy 
The Iranian strategy in Lebanon from post-Israeli invasion in June 1982 to the end 
of 1983 produced significant results. Though they were the only state actor evaluated in 
this period pursuing a total objective of regime overthrow to establish an Islamic 
revolutionary regime in Beirut, the patience with which the Iranian guards pursued that 
objective afforded a sense of initial success for their long-term strategy. While the 
Iranians were far from accomplishing regime overthrow by the end of 1983, let alone 
dominance within the Lebanese-Shiite community itself, in a short period they 
contributed to the development of a growing resistance movement. However, that 
coalition’s survival was far from certain, and its influence over the Shiite community by 
the end of this period still paled in comparison to its Shiite rival Amal, which claimed 
thousands of fighters and was one of al-Assad’s closest allies in Lebanon. 
Despite the Iranian emphasis on indirect support, and the patience with which the 
IRGC developed the resistance forces, it was common knowledge that the Islamic 
resistance was largely an Iranian proxy force. In Baalbek, where the IRGC’s training 
camps were concentrated, the Iranians forced their brand of Islam on the local 
population.303 IRGC guards wore their uniforms, their clerics proselytized to the locals, 
alcohol was removed from stores and hotels, women began wearing full-length black 
chador, and Baalbek’s town square was renamed after Khomeini.304 The resistance’s 
propaganda often included Iranian flags and the intentional absence of Lebanese ones, 
and Iran’s conflict with Iraq was often referenced with depictions of the trampling of the 
Iraqi flag.305 Support for the Iranian-backed Islamic resistance would continue to grow 
however, as they took up the mantle of fighting off the Israeli occupation, which became 
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a major grievance of the Shiite community following the October 1983 Ashura incident 
in Nabitiya.306 
The Iranian decision to employ martyrdom operations also created a number of 
problems for its allies in Lebanon. While the Iranians established the IJO in a veil of 
secrecy, its activities were widely attributed to the Islamic resistance centered in the 
Bekaa Valley by late 1983. The Beirut barracks bombings of October 1983 brought 
significant international attention and direct attacks on the organization.307 The barracks 
bombings brought direct attacks against not only the Islamic resistance, but also Syrian 
forces and their PSP allies in the final months of 1983.308 Perhaps because the IJO terror 
campaign was directed against Israeli and other foreign forces at the time, the Islamic 
resistance did not face any major setbacks due to the implications of its involvement in 
the terror campaign. The Iranian proxy’s employment of martyrdom operations was 
highly controlled and aimed at tactical targets that produced strategic effects, and was far 
from indiscriminate in its application as targets were typically military or governmental 
during this period.309 
The Iranian pursuit of regime overthrow through the development of a 
homogenous coalition of violent NSAs produced some significant strategic results in the 
1982–1983 period. While the Iranians were far from achieving their objective of an 
Islamic regime in Beirut, they had successfully established a growing Islamic resistance 
movement in pockets of the Shiite community in eastern, central, and southern Lebanon. 
Despite the centrality of the Islamic resistance to Iranian designs for Lebanon, the IJO 
sewed the greatest harvest for the Iranian government during this period of the war 
through its strategic martyrdom bombing campaign against the Israelis and MNF. 
However, if you conflate the IJO with Hezbollah, as multiple historians do, the 
contributions of the Islamic resistance in this comprehensive view looks far more 
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significant.310 Either way, the effectiveness with which Iranian strategists developed 
influence in Lebanon in this period cannot be denied. 
E. COMPARISON OF STATE STRATEGIES 
1. Qualitative Analysis 
As with the 1975–1976 period of the Lebanese Civil War, this period ended with 
the domination of Lebanon by the Syrian government. The direct Israeli intervention to 
force what amounted to a coup d’état ended in disaster. The Israeli strategy can attribute 
its failure mostly to its own doing. The objective upon which the strategy was based was 
the ultimate demonstration of hubris. Overconfident with their ability to forge a path 
through the application of violence, the Begin government, encouraged by Defense 
Minister Sharon’s aggressive strategy, put the bulk of the IDF into an operation that 
should never have been pursued in the first place. Freed from their decades-long conflict 
on its southern border through the Israel-Egypt peace agreement, absorbing the incorrect 
lessons from Operation Litani, and determined to destroy the PLO in order to ensure the 
future annexation of the West Bank, the Begin government ordered the IDF into the 
Lebanese quagmire. While the Israeli government had nearly achieved all three of its 
objectives in Lebanon by August 1982, the following month brought about the death of 
their only politically credible ally in Lebanon and the Sabra and Shatilla massacre by the 
hands of its sole NSA ally in central Lebanon. Following the events of September 1982, 
the Israeli actions alienated nearly every faction in Lebanon to include its closest ally 
outside of the south.311 The political fallout domestically proved an even greater obstacle 
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to the Israeli government, and by the end of 1983 Begin had resigned. Israeli forces and 
their SLA proxy remained confined to the security zone along the Israel-Lebanon border 
through the rest of the civil war, never to effectively challenging Syrian influence north 
of the UNIFIL occupied buffer zone. 
The Syrian government, partly assisted by their ally Iran and their own NSA 
coalition, effectively established its dominance over Lebanon like no period before 
1982.312 While the Iranian sponsored IJO terror campaign contributed significantly to the 
MNF’s withdrawal from the country, thus removing a major barrier to Syrian re-entry 
into Beirut, it was not the sole contributing factor. The Syrian strategy of attrition through 
proxy also contributed to first the withdrawal of the IDF from central Lebanon in 1983, 
and second to the withdrawal of the MNF by early 1984. Al-Assad’s indirect strategy 
helped avoid a direct confrontation with either the IDF or the western forces, both of 
which were independently capable of destroying the Syrian armed forces in Lebanon. 
The Syrian government’s ability to maintain ties to a broad heterogeneous coalition of 
Lebanese politicians, NSA allies, and proxies allowed al-Assad to indirectly pressure his 
enemies to withdraw from Lebanon and in their wake establish influence over much of 
the country indirectly. Unlike the Israelis, Syrian forces did not have to be present in 
large numbers in order to extend al-Assad’s influence in an area, as its multiple allies and 
proxies could serve as stand-ins in a complex and fluid system of indirect rule. While 
Iranian influence would continue to grow in the post 1983 period, the remainder of the 
conflict would be dominated by the march toward Pax Syriana. 
2. Social Network Analysis 
The SNA of the 1983 organizational network lends additional support to the 
conclusions drawn from the qualitative historical analysis above.313 At the conclusion of 
1983, Israel’s homogeneous coalition of Christian militias was broken and lacked 
influence over the network, the Iranians had built a closely connected homogeneous 
coalition with expanding influence, and the Syrians had solidified their dominance of the 
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Lebanese civil war environment through their influence over a broad heterogeneous 
coalition of state and NSA allies in Lebanon. In 1983, the network consisted of twenty 
agents and thirty-five organizations. 
 
Figure 2.  Lebanese Civil War Organizations Network 1983 
Figure 2 presents a visualization of the Lebanese Civil War organizational 
network at the end of 1983. As before, isolates are hidden, the size of the nodes reflects 
betweenness centrality, nodes are colored by type where states are green and NSAs are 
blue, and tie thickness reflects the un-scaled value of the relationship. 
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a. Network Topography. 
The network topography measures are presented in Table 5. In 1983 the network 
consisted of 35 nodes and 100 directed ties. The characteristic (average) path length was 
11.891, which is relatively unchanged from 1976. Both network density (0.082) and 
average degree (30.0) were double of what they were in 1976, while network cohesion 
had increased slightly to 0.887. Krackhardt’s measure of (0.408) was much lower than it 
was in 1976 while the reciprocity score increased slightly from 0.076 to 0.125. 













As in the previous chapter subgroup analysis was used in order to compare and 
contrast each state’s influence. The clique analysis results are presented in Table 6. A 
total of eleven cliques of size three or larger were identified. Of those, Syria was a 
member of six, while Israel and Iran were members of two. Each of the cliques of which 
Syria was member possessed a minimum of twenty-four external links, while Israel’s had 
less than nine each and Iran’s had a minimum of sixteen, thus providing additional 
evidence of Syria’s influence across the network. 
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Table 6.   Clique Group Membership 
 
 
Newman group analysis identified four groups. The results are presented in Table 
7. Israel was assigned (partitioned) to the largest Newman group, and nearly 90% of that 
group’s ties were internal rather than external. Iran and Syria were partitioned into 
separate groups, and both of their groups’ ties were evenly split between internal and 
external ties, which suggests that each country possesses the ability to extend its 
influence beyond the borders of their Newman group. 




c. Analysis of Individual Actors 
Table 8 presents the same centrality measures as before in order to assess Syria’s 
influence in the network. As the table indicates, Syria ranked first in all categories but 
one (authority centrality), and typically by a substantial amount when compared to the 
other state actors. The one exception was betweenness centrality, where Israel ranked 
exceptionally high. This was principally because in 1983 Israel served as one of only two 
actors that brokered between the two major clusters in the network. By contrast, Iran’s 
betweenness score is low because it did not function as a significant broker in the 
network. This can be seen in in Figure 2, which clearly shows Israel as a broker between 
the two network clusters, while Iran is located in the center of the largest cluster. The low 
ranking of the rest of Israel’s centrality scores suggests that it exerted very little influence 
within Lebanon by the end of 1983. 
The Syrian government’s lead in nearly all centrality measures provides strong 
evidence of its superior network influence. Its total degree centrality score of 0.078 
indicates that it had the highest total number of connections in the network, while its in-
degree and out-degree scores indicate that it had a similar number of outgoing and 
incoming directed ties. Its high ranking and substantially higher eigenvector, hub, and 
authority scores provide further evidence of its superior influence in the network.314 
While Iran was not as influential as its ally Syria, the scores indicate that within only 18 
months the Iranians built a high degree of influence in a network of which they were not 
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Table 8.   Actor Centrality Scores 
		 Syria	 Israel	 Iran	
Measure	 Rank	 Value	 Rank	 Value	 Rank	 Value	
Betweenness	Centrality	 1	 0.551	 2	 0.299	 15	 0.027	
Total	Degree	Centrality	 1	 0.078	 12	 0.016	 6	 0.033	
In-Degree	Centrality	 1	 0.076	 16	 0.015	 6	 0.041	
Out-Degree	Centrality	 1	 0.103	 13	 0.016	 4	 0.051	
Eigenvector	Centralitya	 1	 0.495	 25	 0.002	 4	 0.337	
Hub	Centralitya	 1	 0.508	 23	 0.002	 4	 0.324	
Authority	Centralitya	 2	 0.430	 25	 0	 5	 0.281	
    a Calculated using UCINET 6.0. 
d. SNA Conclusion 
The SNA of the Lebanese organizational network environment at the end of 1983 
quantitatively supports the qualitative analysis of the same period. Begin and Sharon’s 
policy in Lebanon resulted in Israel having some of the lowest centrality scores, 
indicating extremely low influence over the network. The analysis reveals that Iran’s 
unique strategy had developed greater network influence than Israel’s strategy, 
positioning the state as one of the most influential actors within Lebanon. The SNA 
supports the conclusion that the Syrian government had built significant influence over 
the Lebanese network following the Israeli invasion and subsequent withdrawal from 
central Lebanon. The Syrian strategy of pursuing a limited objective through a 
combination of direct and indirect support to a large heterogeneous coalition of NSA and 
state allies in Lebanon had developed the most influential state network in Lebanon at the 
end of 1983. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The qualitative and quantitative analysis of the 1982 to 1983 period of the 
Lebanese Civil War provides a thorough evaluation of three different state strategies to 
influence an intrastate environment. This section demonstrated the ineffectiveness of a 
strategy that emphasizes direct and unilateral means to achieve a limited objective. While 
the Israeli government did not intend to overthrow the Lebanese government, but merely 
to ensure the election of a Lebanese politician who had declared his bid for the 
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presidency months before the invasion, the lack of political and organizational depth 
within its homogeneous alliance contributed to its failed policy. The Iranian 
government’s pursuit of regime overthrow through the primarily indirect support of a 
small homogenous coalition produced significant influence by the end of the period in 
spite of a combination of features that can often result in failure. Lastly, the analysis 
reveals that the Syrian strategy of pursuing of a limited objective through a combination 
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V. THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR: 1984-1990 
From 1984 on the war in Lebanon was in part a proxy war between Israel and the 
Syrian-Iranian alliance.315 The Syrian government increasingly dominated Lebanon, as 
al-Assad established influence over the majority of the country through a combination of 
direct and indirect means. The Iranians played a supporting role, but their ideology and 
strategic objectives often conflicted with that of their ally, resulting in multiple proxy 
wars between Iranian and Syrian surrogates. The Israeli government gradually withdrew 
its forces from central Lebanon until by 1985 they were confined to a five-mile security 
strip on the southern border, their forces there harassed by a plethora of militias and 
terrorist groups. Despite the stark differences between Syrian and Iranian policy in 
Lebanon through the mid-1980s, eventually the Iranian government’s foreign policy 
moderated, thus ensuring the successful implementation of the Pax Syriana—in no small 
part aided by Iranian efforts. By the end of 1990 the Syrian government’s strategy had 
achieved a settlement in Lebanon and secured its objective of Syrian-backed governance 
throughout much of the country. The Syrian policy succeeded in part because the al-
Assad government consistently pursued a limited objective of government reinforcement 
through a combination of direct and indirect means to support a broad heterogeneous 
coalition of NSAs employing both violent and non-violent tactics. The Iranians remained 
significant players in Lebanon largely due to their strategic alliance with Syria, but also 
because they adopted limited rather than unlimited objectives through indirect support of 
a homogenous coalition of NSAs that evolved to incorporate both violent and non-violent 
techniques. 
A study of the conclusion of the Lebanese Civil War from 1984 to 1990 reveals 
relevant lessons for states seeking to establish influence in civil wars through the 
effective support of NSAs by both direct and indirect means. The Israeli policy had 
clearly failed by as early as the fall of 1982 with the death of Bashir Gemayel, and as a 
result their influence remained confined to southern Lebanon as Israeli forces and their 
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proxy the SLA focused on security there. Israeli policy will not be analyzed in this 
section because its role in shaping the direction of the conflict was severely weakened 
throughout this period beyond the south. The Iranian policy reflects the ability of state 
actors and their surrogates to moderate over a short period of time. The Iranian 
government’s adoption of pragmatism over revisionism spread subsequently to 
Hezbollah, and this transition proved critical to the state’s continued influence in 
Lebanon beyond the 1990 period. The Syrian policy remained consistent throughout the 
conflict. The al-Assad government’s policy in Lebanon validates the merits of a long-
term commitment to a limited objective through the combination of indirect and direct 
support to a broad heterogeneous coalition of NSAs employing both violent and non-
violent tactics. In this section, both Iranian and Syrian policy will be evaluated separately 
and then compared in the conclusion using both qualitative analysis and SNA. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 1984-1990 
Following the failed Israeli intervention, the Syrian government continued to 
reestablish influence across Lebanon from 1984 to 1987, primarily through indirect 
means; fighting was increasingly typified as both inter-confessional and cross 
confessional in the post-Israeli intervention period. In 1985 alone there was conflict 
amongst the Maronites between three different factions, amongst the Shia between 
Hezbollah and Amal, and the Sunni Muslims were split largely along regional lines.316 
Syria attempted to reinforce the Beirut government primarily through proxies; in some 
instances Syrian-backed militias fought Iranian-backed ones, straining the Syria-Iran 
alliance on multiple occasions. In one instance in 1984, the Iranian backed Sunni Islamist 
group Tawheed fought a Syrian-backed Alawi militia for control of Tripoli.317 Often 
these proxy conflicts in Lebanon would be mediated through direct negotiations in 
Damascus between the two-states and their respective proxy leaders.318 
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As in early 1976, the Syrian government drifted toward direct intervention to 
secure its objectives in Lebanon as indirect methods proved insufficient. In February 
1987, 7,000 Syrian troops entered Beirut to establish security and prevent the defeat of its 
ally Amal by Hezbollah and their allies, and by April their forces were patrolling as far 
south as Sidon.319 In May 1988 fighting between Amal and Hezbollah once again drew 
direct Syrian intervention in Beirut. The fighting subsided under another ceasefire fire, 
but not until after tense exchanges between the two state sponsors, during which the 
Iranians threatened to use IRGC troops directly against al-Assad’s forces.320 By the end 
of 1988 however, a crisis was developing within Lebanon that proved a far greater threat 
to Syrian designs. 
In September 1988 there occurred a presidential succession crisis in Lebanon as a 
major Maronite faction continued to prevent Syrian efforts to secure the election of a new 
al-Assad-backed president to replace Amin Gemayel at the expiration of his term.321 By 
the end of the month, the outgoing president handed presidential powers over to a new 
Christian prime minister, General Michel Aoun, resulting in the government splitting 
between PM Aoun and existing PM Slim al-Hoss.322 Despite the years-long civil war, 
this was the first time the Lebanese government institutions had been semi-officially 
divided between the warring factions.323 The Syrians and their coalition of NSA allies 
and proxies backed the Muslim supported al-Hoss government, while the Aoun 
government received support from their mutual enemy Iraq. Despite continued inter-
confessional and cross-confessional fighting, the rest of the war would be dominated by 
the struggle between the two governments. 
In the final years of the war, the coalition behind the Syrian-backed al-Hoss 
government grew to include not only the entire reformist camp of the Lebanese NSAs, 
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but also the entire Arab community except for the Iraqi government.324 The Saudi 
brokered Taif Agreement reinforced the legitimacy of the al-Hoss government in the fall 
of 1989. The Taif Agreement addressed many of the reformist grievances, decreasing the 
power of the Christian president, increasing the number of deputies in the National 
Assembly, splitting delegates evenly between Christians and Muslims.325 The Maronite 
political leaders supported the agreement except for Aoun, who rejected the clauses 
permitting the continuation of Syrian occupation.326 A coalition of pro-al-Hoss forces, 
both Maronite and Muslim, fought Aoun’s forces, but were unable to achieve victory by 
the summer of 1990. When Saddam invaded Kuwait in August 1990 however, Syria’s 
participation in the coalition against him earned the state a green light from the George 
Bush administration, bringing Aoun’s forces to heel in the final major battle of the 
Lebanese Civil War in October 1990.327 The U.S. government’s consent to al-Assad’s 
control over Lebanon in exchange for Syria’s participation in Desert Storm was critical in 
light of the decline of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new geopolitical 
reality.328 While the Iranians publicly opposed Taif, their position had moderated 
following Khomeini’s death in 1989, and they exchanged acceptance of al-Assad’s policy 
in Lebanon for Syrian recognition of Hezbollah as both a military and political force.329 
By 1991 the Syrians had 40,000 troops in Lebanon propping up the Hrawi government, 
their presence legitimized by the Lebanese and regional governments under the Taif 
Agreement.330 
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B. SYRIAN STRATEGY 
1. Objective 
Throughout this period the Syrian government remained focused on reinforcing 
the existing government in Lebanon, with a preference toward the reformist vision of the 
Muslim community rather than the status quo Christian vision. The objective was limited, 
as al-Assad supported political reforms that would create a more equal distribution of 
political power between Christians and Muslims, while still retaining the overall political 
structure established by the 1943 National Pact.331 By establishing a pro-Syrian 
government in Beirut, al-Assad hoped to use Syrian influence in Lebanon in order to 
rebalance the Arab-Israeli conflict more in Syria’s favor.332  
Syrian policy in Lebanon was a component of its overall national strategy to 
rebalance the Arab-Israeli conflict away from Israel in the hopes of bringing forth 
negotiations that would recover the Golan.333 By dominating the Beirut government the 
Syrians could bloc Israeli influence. Through the presence of its NSA allies in southern 
Lebanon, al-Assad had a bargaining chip in any future negotiations for the Golan 
Heights.334 The alliance with Iran was a critical part of this rebalancing, as it helped 
replace the loss of Egypt in the conflict and reduced the threat from Iraq.335 For al-Assad 
the calculations in Lebanon were consistently pragmatic, non-ideological, and limited, 
committed to establishing Syrian dominance in Lebanon in order to shift the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in their favor. 
2. Allied Agents in Lebanon 
The Syrian government continued to develop a large heterogeneous coalition of 
NSAs consisting of powerful political leaders, political parties, and militias through to the 
resolution of the conflict. By 1990 this coalition consisted of NSAs from every major 
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confessional group, to include Maronites. The Syrians were able to rebuild influence 
within the Lebanese government as early as 1982. Despite his election occurring under 
Israeli occupation in September 1982, the Syrian government increased its influence over 
President Amin Gemayel as the Israelis withdrew from central Lebanon and the MNF 
withdrew from Beirut in 1984.336 Partly through its influence over Gemayel, by 1985 the 
Syrian position in the country was more influential than at any other period since the 
beginning of the war.337 However, years of Syrian influence over Gemayel did not 
prevent his decision on 22 September 1988, under great pressure from the Maronite 
political bloc, to appoint Lebanese army General Michel Aoun as Prime Minister in order 
to satisfy the concerns of the Maronite community over Muslim dominance following his 
departure.338 The Syrians, and much of their coalition of NSAs, backed the current PM 
al-Hoss and his government and helped ensure its eventual victory over the Aoun 
government. 
Syria also maintained a broad heterogeneous coalition of militias and proxy forces 
throughout the latter years of the conflict, in some cases encouraging internecine fighting 
to ensure that its surrogates dominated their respective confessions but were never strong 
enough to stand without Syrian support. Despite the NSA’s competing vision for 
Lebanon, the Syrian government supported Hezbollah in part to ensure that its competitor 
Amal did not become strong enough to reject Syrian influence.339 A similar strategy was 
used against the PLO. Al-Assad had a long-standing policy of securing influence over the 
PLO and supplanting Arafat’s leadership with a pro-Syrian Palestinian, which became 
Abu Musa. From 1982 on al-Assad supported his Syrian backed Palestine National 
Salvation Front (PNSF) under Abu Musa to fight and effectively supplant Arafat’s 
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leadership in Lebanon by summer 1987.340 The Syrians also supported a Maronite militia 
under Elie Hobeika who fought the Christian Lebanese Forces militia under the command 
of Samir Geagea.341 The Syrian coalition, though not directly tied to the Syrian 
government but supportive of the Syrian-backed al-Hoss government, quickly expanded 
with the political consensus of Taif. Following the acceptance of Taif by the Lebanese 
Assembly in 1989, three major Maronite political parties and their respective militias 
backed the agreement, and some fought against Aoun backed by the Syrians in the 1990 
campaign to defeat him.342 By the end of 1990 the list of significant militias within the 
Syrian coalition was far longer than those that opposed it; with the Aoun faction defeated 
the remaining holdouts were principally the Palestinian rejectionists.343 
3. Methods of Supporting Allies 
The Syrian government employed political, logistical, and direct military support 
to its NSA allies in Lebanon to secure their policy objective. Al-Assad aggressively 
supported its political allies in Lebanon, in some cases resorting to assassination to ensure 
his surrogate’s success.344 Simultaneously, the Syrian government was quick to support 
politicians who were willing to come into the fold. Following months of propaganda 
deriding him as a puppet, in early 1984 al-Assad welcomed President Amin Gemayel at 
the Damascus airport during his first official visit, securing the Lebanese government’s 
abrogation of the Israel-Lebanon accord in March 1984.345 Syrian officials also 
intervened repeatedly to negotiate ceasefires and agreements in order to protect their 
proxies and allies. In November 1990 the Iranian and Syrian governments negotiated the 
second Damascus Agreement between Hezbollah and Amal after which fighting between 
the groups ended.346 The Taif Agreement is the best example of the Syrian government’s 
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proficiency at securing its policy objectives in Lebanon through political support of its 
allies. Under the agreement, the Syrian-backed al-Hoss government was further 
legitimized along with the Syrian occupation.347 
Syrian logistical support to its allies in Lebanon was principally through arms 
shipments and controlling cross-border routes from Syria into Lebanon. The Syrian 
economy did not provide the government a large budget for the sponsorship of its allies. 
In spite of its Iranian oil subsidy beginning in 1982, the Syrians had amassed a debt to 
Iran of five billion dollars by 1989.348 Some of Syria’s closest allies were able to foster 
their own resource base however, and relied principally on Syria for what it had plenty 
of: Soviet-bloc weapons. Syria’s ability to supply arms to isolated Iran was also an 
important part of their mutual logistical support during this period.349 Two of Syria’s 
major NSA allies, the Druze PSP militia and the Shia Amal militia, were social 
movements that were able to operate primarily using internal resources. Their logistical 
dependence on Syria was largely for arms shipments.350 However, internal resourcing 
had its limits, and those organizations that could leverage substantial external resources 
often held a competitive advantage over those that relied primarily on internal resources. 
In the case of Amal, the lack of significant external support from its ally Syria proved a 
major handicap when confronted with the Iranian-financed Hezbollah.351 Despite their 
economic challenges, Syria’s geographic location and control of routes into the country 
and its ample supply of arms provided sufficient logistical support to many of its 
Lebanese NSA allies. 
Syrian direct military support to its proxies and allies proved significant by the 
late 1980s through to the last major battle of the conflict in October 1990. Since the 1976 
intervention, and even during the Israeli intervention, the Syrian army maintained 
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thousands of troops in Lebanon, concentrated in the Bekaa Valley.352 Prior to 1987, the 
Syrian army typically intervened where necessary to support its proxies, and reinforced 
the Lebanese government’s authority in the absence of an effective Lebanese army. In 
1987 however, possibly frustrated by the inability of its proxy forces to secure Beirut, al-
Assad sent 7,000 troops there to attempt to stabilize the situation on behalf of the Syrian-
backed Lebanese government.353 By the spring of 1988 Syrian forces were conducting 
operations as far south as Sidon, far closer to the southern border than the Israelis had 
previously tolerated.354 In order to ensure the victory of the official Beirut government 
under Taif, al-Assad’s forces destroyed General Aoun’s forces in October 1990.355 The 
Syrian’s destruction of Aoun’s forces with the support of both the Lebanese government 
and the Syrian multi-confessional coalition of NSAs served as a powerful warning to 
those militias that did not agree to demobilization under the implementation of the Taif 
Agreement.356 Once the Syrian forces effectively established a monopoly of force in the 
country, it disarmed its opponents, while allowing its closest allies to avoid 
demobilization so long as they confined their activities to the Bekaa Valley and in the 
south against Israel.357 
4. Assessment of Strategy 
Syria achieved its policy objective in Lebanon by the end of 1990 largely through 
direct support of a heterogeneous coalition of NSAs that employed both violent and non-
violent tactics. The Syrian government consistently pursued a limited objective of 
government reinforcement with minor modifications to the confessional makeup of the 
government. Although following the Israeli intervention Syrian means of support were 
primarily indirect, by 1987, unable to secure its objectives through its proxy forces alone, 
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and no longer faced with the direct threat from Israeli forces in central Lebanon, the 
Syrians increasingly relied on direct methods to enable its NSA allies. These direct 
methods secured the Syrian-controlled Lebanese government a monopoly of force within 
Lebanon, and enabled demobilization of most of the militias that had fought throughout 
the war. 
The Syrian direct methods contributed to the gradual expansion of its NSA 
coalition so that by the end of 1990 there were no significant militia forces willing to 
oppose its coalition. Another significant factor in securing the monopoly of force was the 
fact that many of these NSAs were the militias of political parties that had been 
participating in the Syrian backed negotiation process for years, and were familiar with 
both violent and non-violent tactics. Though some of its allies were not satisfied with the 
Taif Agreement reforms, most notably the PSP, they did voluntarily decommission their 
militia forces at the conclusion of Taif as their leaders returned their focused to politics. 
However, some militias were allowed to retain their weapons because of their usefulness 
in Syria’s strategy to leverage resistance in the south as a bargaining chip in the Arab-
Israeli conflict.358 Partly as a result of its alliance with Iran, the Syrians secured an 
exception for Hezbollah to both maintain its resistance force, and to simultaneously 
participate in the political process so long as its forces were solely used against Israel and 
not the Lebanese.359 The factions of the PLO that rejected Arafat’s leadership were 
allowed to retain their weapons and operate from the safe haven of the Bekaa Valley 
while the rest were disarmed.360 However, in some cases long-time Syrian allies 
decommissioned their militias voluntarily. Amal, Syria’s staunch ally in Lebanon since 
the late 1970s, voluntarily disarmed in 1990 as Nabih Berri focused on politics.361 While 
the Syrian NSA coalition was formidable at the end of this period, significant factions 
within it were willing to disarm following the effective implementation of Taif, 
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demonstrating the value of maintaining a coalition of organizations that employed both 
violent and non-violent techniques. 
C. IRANIAN STRATEGY 
1. Objective 
During much of the 1980s the Iranian revolutionaries pursued a revisionist foreign 
policy focused on exporting Islamic revolution throughout the region, especially in 
Lebanon where the Shia population was uniquely open to radicalization.362 Following 
Khomeini’s death, Ayatollah Khamenei succeeded him, and with President Hashemi 
Rafsanjani’s presidency, Iran adopted a pragmatist foreign policy.363 During the first 
extraordinary conclave in Tehran that same year, the pragmatists in Hezbollah also won 
out, thus the organization gradually adopted the Iranian policy.364 The pragmatist policy 
aligned Iranian objectives in Lebanon with the Syrian government’s, thus ensuring that 
under the new Pax Syriana the Iranians and Hezbollah would have a seat at the table. 
2. Allied Agents in Lebanon 
The Iranian government’s NSA allies in Lebanon were principally Hezbollah and 
some smaller Islamist groups, most notably Tawheed in Tripoli. While Hezbollah was 
largely dependent upon Iran in the mid-1980s and fully embraced its ideology, by the late 
1980s the organization had developed more freedom to set its course within Lebanon’s 
multi-confessional landscape, much of which rejected Islamist ideology.365 The NSA and 
its sponsor remained strong allies throughout the period. Even though similar pragmatist 
and revisionist wings of each organization were vying for dominance in the late 1980s, 
neither of these groups advocated separation between Hezbollah and Iran.366 At some 
point in the 1980s the command of Islamic Jihad (IJO) passed over from the IRGC 
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commander in Lebanon to officials in Hezbollah’s shadowy security apparatus, further 
empowering the organization.367 By 1990 Hezbollah had successfully established its 
dominance of resistance in the south and gradually moved toward political participation 
within the Lebanese system rather than rejection.368 By the end of the 1980s Hezbollah 
could field a total of 10,000 fighters if necessary.369 
Iranian support of predominantly Islamist NSAs with revolutionary objectives 
during the mid-1980s frequently brought them into conflict with Syrian forces. The 
Iranians fostered ties with Saeed Shaaban, of Tawheed in Tripoli, a Sunni Islamist group 
that supported Islamic revolution in Lebanon.370 During the mid-1980s Tawheed fought 
intermittently with the Syrian backed Arab Democratic Party (ADP), drawing Syrian 
troops into the fighting, and subsequently forcing state level mediation between Iran and 
Syria to broker ceasefire agreements.371 Repeated fighting between Hezbollah and Amal 
often brought Syrian military intervention and subsequent Iranian diplomatic initiatives to 
resolve the conflict. However, as the pragmatist policy came into being, Iran-Syria proxy 
conflict diminished, most significantly after the signing of a ceasefire agreement between 
Hezbollah and Amal in 1990.372 
3. Methods of Supporting Allies 
 Tehran primarily supported Hezbollah through logistical and political support. 
The Iranian government leveraged its political influence with Damascus through their 
alliance in order to secure Hezbollah safe haven, logistics, and political legitimacy from 
Syria. Iran depended upon Syrian political support in order to maintain its support of 
Hezbollah, which the revisionists were reminded of in the summer of 1987 as Syrian 
forces restricted their surrogate’s logistics in response to Hezbollah-Amal fighting in 
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Beirut.373 During the late 1980s, Iranian officials elevated the status of Hezbollah’s 
leadership by setting up face-to-face negotiations with senior officials of Hezbollah and 
Syria, and sometimes using Hezbollah leaders as brokers between the Syrian government 
and other NSAs in Lebanon.374 Iran-Hezbollah moderation in the late 1980s aligned the 
organizations’ objectives with Syria, thus reducing the friction between the groups and 
legitimizing Hezbollah’s armed resistance following Taif implementation.375 
The Iranian government’s logistical support to Hezbollah was critical to the 
organization’s rise, as well as the Iranian government’s ability to exert influence over the 
group. Through the 1980s Hezbollah received anywhere from $16 to $120 million 
annually from Iran while its primary competitor, Amal, had to rely on domestic sources 
of funding.376 Iranian funding made it possible for Hezbollah to provide social services to 
the Shia community, essentially building loyalty by providing government services in the 
absence of the Lebanese state.377 Amal could not compete with the extensive social 
service programs that by the mid-1980s were providing medical care, subsidized 
pharmaceuticals, welfare benefits, and subsidized grocery stores.378 The financing also 
ensured that Hezbollah fighters were some of the best paid. The commander of Israel’s 
proxy, the SLA, complained that Hezbollah fighters were paid three times more than his 
fighters.379 While Hezbollah would develop domestic sources of funding through the 
1980s, its rapid rise was in part due to its strong external logistical and political support 
from Iran. Hezbollah’s logistical dependence upon Iran in the late 1980s also ensured that 
the pragmatists maintained leverage over the organization in the event they attempted a 
return to revisionism.380 
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4. Assessment of Strategy 
The Iranian government secured long-term influence in Lebanon by evolving its 
objectives in Lebanon to better align with its strategic ally, Syria, for which its 
involvement in Lebanon depended. The pursuit of revisionist objectives in Lebanon 
through its surrogate Hezbollah brought Iran into conflict with Syria multiple times prior 
to the moderation of Iranian strategy following Khomeini’s death. Once Iranian policy 
had moderated, they pursued a limited objective of influence in Lebanon and the Arab-
Israeli conflict through indirect support of a homogenous NSA employing violent and 
non-violent tactics. The key to continued Iranian influence was in its relationship with 
Syria, which the pragmatists had successfully ensured as early as 1989 by aligning their 
policy with its ally’s. 
While the Iranian strategy of indirect support of a homogenous and predominantly 
violent NSA evolved in the late 1980s, Iranian policy in Lebanon frequently brought 
Hezbollah and its affiliates in conflict with powerful enemies, to include its only state 
ally in the region. In March 1985 a CIA sponsored operation by local surrogates 
attempted to kill the suspected leader of Hezbollah, Sheikh Fadlallah, but failed.381 In 
actuality Fadlallah was not a part of the Hezbollah leadership, although many Hezbollah 
members revered him.382 Hezbollah’s war with Amal repeatedly escalated tensions 
between Syria and Iran, and on one occasions Syrian forces attacked Hezbollah and killed 
dozens of members.383 In response to this attack on its forces, and any attack that could 
be leveraged for propaganda purposes, the Islamists conducted mass funerals, 
demonstrating their popular support as a highly effective warning to their enemies.384 
Ultimately however, the Iran-Hezbollah coalition adopted restraint and moderated their 
approach, conducting fewer terror attacks as the 1980s went by, and altering their policy 
toward the kidnapping of westerners.385 
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D. COMPARISON OF STATE STRATEGIES 
1. Qualitative Analysis 
Following the Israeli intervention in Lebanon, both Syria and Iran pursued vastly 
different objectives despite their alliance. Al-Assad, consistent with his policy since the 
first years of the civil war, pursued a limited objective of regime reinforcement in order 
to secure influence in Lebanon and gain greater balance in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
Iranian revolutionary government, eager to spread Islamic revolution across the region, 
initially pursued a total objective of overthrowing the Lebanese government through a 
radical movement. The conflicting state objectives proved contentious, as fighting 
between Iranian and Syrian proxies occurred multiple times until the pragmatists 
solidified their control of the government of Tehran and pursued a more realist foreign 
policy. Once the pragmatists led by President Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Khamenei 
transitioned Iranian policy away from revisionism toward pragmatism and aligned their 
policy in Lebanon with their Syrian allies, the two states largely cooperated in order to 
support Syria’s efforts to establish dominant influence in Lebanon.386 
The strategies of both states were widely different throughout this period. The 
Syrian government pursued its limited objective in Lebanon through a combination of 
indirect and direct support to a broad heterogeneous coalition of both violent and non-
violent NSAs. The Iranians pursued their revisionist objective in Lebanon indirectly 
through support of a small homogeneous coalition of largely Shia radicals with a 
preference for violent methods. Prior to the pragmatist evolution of the late 1980s, 
Hezbollah did develop an Iranian-funded network of social services, which developed a 
large mass base amongst the Shia lower classes and helped broaden the scope of the 
movement’s tactics to include non-violent techniques such as mass protest.387 As the 
pragmatist evolution solidified in the late 1980s, Hezbollah reduced its employment of 
terrorism and focused its violence against Israeli forces and their proxies in south 
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Lebanon.388 Simultaneously, encouraged by the Iranians, Hezbollah gravitated toward 
politics and additional non-violent means to gain influence, though this transition was 
only beginning in 1990.389 
On the surface, the Iranian strategy demonstrates the relative speed with which a 
state can develop influence in an intrastate environment through the employment of a 
homogeneous coalition of NSAs that emphasize violent techniques. However, the key to 
the Iranian government’s success in Lebanon was Syrian government tolerance of Iranian 
activities.390 Al-Assad’s foreign policy decision to maintain the alliance was primarily 
based on the value Iran added to his efforts in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and not on 
economic and domestic factors that would have led to the opposite decision.391 Taif was 
backed by the Arab League with a two billion dollar reconstruction fund by 1990, and al-
Assad was strongly encouraged by the Saudis and other Arab states to break with Iran.392 
From al-Assad’s perspective, Iran was far more effective at assisting Syria against Israel 
than were the Saudis, and as a result the alliance remained strong since its inception in 
spite of the domestic and economic reasons to abandon it.393 As Syria and its NSA 
coalition had demonstrated numerous times over the course of the conflict, any NSA that 
resisted the objectives of the Syrian bloc was sure to face substantial repression. While 
the Iran-Hezbollah coalition proved effective at quickly building influence across 
Lebanon through this period, their success was ultimately the direct result of Syrian 
approval. 
The Syrian government’s strategy of direct means to support a heterogeneous 
coalition of violent and non-violent NSAs proved effective but was highly costly for a 
state with such limited means. In spite of its small economy, the Syrian government held 
many advantages in Lebanon by the late 1980s that enabled its policy there. The Syrians 
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shared a cultural identity with the Lebanese, in spite of the many different religious 
confessions in each country; they shared a common language and historical experience 
under both the French mandate and Ottoman rule. The Syrian government’s near pariah 
status amongst the community of nations was mitigated through its strong alliance with 
the Soviet Union, which supported Syrian policy in the United Nations.394 As the USSR 
dissolved in 1990, Syria took advantage of the growing international response to 
Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, which earned the Syrian army carte blanche to destroy the 
remaining opposition to the Syrian-backed Lebanese government.395 The international 
community, to include France and the U.S, supported the Taif Agreement.396 Through its 
occupation of Lebanon the Syrian government is suspected to have benefited 
economically as the war died down, gaining access to the world economy via Lebanon, 
its citizens earning over one billion dollars annually employed there, and the Syrian army 
made money through smuggling and trade rackets.397 Ultimately the policy did achieve 
al-Assad’s primary objective, to establish dominance in Lebanon in order to alter the 
balance of the Arab-Israeli conflict in Syria’s favor. The Syrian government’s success at 
dominating Lebanon demonstrates the potential of a weak state with high levels of 
external support to directly influence a complex civil war environment through a long-
term and expensive commitment largely funded by external sources. 
2. Social Network Analysis 
The SNA of the organizational network of the Lebanese Civil War at the end of 
1990 supports the qualitative assessment that the Syrian government dominated the 
network.398 No longer challenged north of the security zone by the IDF, the Syrian 
government built a large and heterogeneous coalition of NSA allies that effectively 
defeated the last remaining holdout in the final months of 1990. The Iranian government 
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and Hezbollah, after moving away from revisionism and adopting pragmatism, largely 
cooperated with Syria, thus increasing their own influence in the network while 
reinforcing al-Assad’s influence. The SNA also reveals that the Israeli government’s 
influence was nearly insignificant. The network consists of sixteen individuals and 
twenty-nine organizations. Figure 3 presents a visualization of the Lebanese Civil War 
organizations network at the end of 1990. The size of each node reflects betweenness 
centrality. The nodes are colored by type. States are colored green and NSAs are colored 
blue. The thickness of relationship links is based on the un-scaled value of the 
relationship and the arrows depict the direction of the relationship. Isolates were removed 
from this visualization. 
 
Figure 3.  Lebanese Civil War Organizations Network 1990 
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a. Network Topography  
Network topography measures for the 1990 organizational network are presented 
in Table 9. The network consisted of 29 nodes and 86 directed ties. The characteristic 
path length was 8.843, which was substantially lower than it was in 1976 (11.915) and 
1983 (11.891), indicating that the network is less distributed and more connected than 
before. Network density was 0.102, which was twice what it was in 1976 and nearly 25% 
greater than in 1983. This increase in density is somewhat misleading because network 
was smaller in 1990 (29) than it was in 1983 (35). Indeed, average degree centrality 
(26.97) decreased from 1983 (30), which indicates that the network was less dense in 
1990 than it was in 1983. Nevertheless, average degree centrality in 1990 was still 
substantially higher than it was in 1976 (17.69). Network cohesion was 1.0 (100%), 
which indicates that all of the organizations with at least one tie were either directly or 
indirectly tied to one another.399 Krackhardt’s measure of hierarchy was 0.313, which is 
substantially lower than it was in 1976 (78%) and 1983 (40.8%), while the percentage of 
reciprocal ties (20.7%) was much higher than it was in 1976 (7.6%) and 1983 (12.5%). 
Overall the 1990 network topography values indicate that the network has become far 
more compact and flatter, as organizations share more links (compared to 1976, and only 
slightly less than 1983) along shorter paths, and a larger portion of which are reciprocal 
rather than directed. Research indicates that networks that have higher degrees of 
cohesion are more likely to adhere to accepted norms and behavior.400 The broad 
consensus amongst the organizations to move toward conflict resolution in 1990 is 
qualitative evidence of the network’s greater cohesion and acceptance of established 
norms compared to the other periods. 
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Subgroup analysis was conducted in order to compare each state actor’s influence 
in the network. The results for clique analysis are presented in Table 10. The clique 
analysis detected eleven total cliques of size three or larger, all of which Syria was a 
member. Iran was in two cliques while Israel was not in any. Of the two cliques in which 
both Iran and Syria were members, these cliques held two of the three highest numbers of 
external links. The Syrian government’s presence in all of the cliques supports the 
conclusion that Syria had a dominating influence in the network. Although Iran was only 
in two of the eleven cliques, its presence in two of the most externally connected cliques 
suggests that its presence helped reinforce the Syrian government’s influence. 
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Table 10.    Clique Group Membership 
 
 
Newman group analysis identified five groups. The results are presented in Table 
11. Israel’s Newman group was the smallest and had the fewest external links: three. The 
Syrian Newman group was one of the largest, but more importantly it possessed 29 
external links, 19 more than Iran’s group. Its far greater number of external ties is another 
indicator of the degree to which it and its closest allies were able to influence the 
network. 
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Table 11.   Newman Group Membership 
 
 
c. Analysis of Individual Actors 
Table 12 presents the same centrality measures we examined in the previous 
chapters. Once again, they suggest that Syria was the most influential country. It ranked 
first in every centrality measure. Its betweenness centrality (0.738) was far higher than its 
competitors and indicates the state’s potential to broker communication between groups 
and organizations in the network. Its total degree centrality (0.055) reflects the high 
number of connections it had across the network relative to its competition, and its 
greater number of incoming and outgoing ties further demonstrates its superior influence. 
Syria also had far higher eigenvector, hub, and authority centrality scores than its 
competition, indicating its ability to both receive and distribute resources across the 
network.401 Iran ranked in the top four of every centrality measure except one. However, 
its scores are more than a standard deviation below those of Syria. Israel’s influence was 
very low according to the centrality measures. In the few cases where the Israeli 
government was ranked in the middle, its actual centrality scores were still far below 
those of Syria, Iran, and other organizations. Taken together, these results provide further 
quantitative evidence that the Syrian government had established not just high degrees of 
influence but near dominance over the network. 
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Table 12.   Actor Centrality Scores 
		 Syria	 Israel	 Iran	
Measure	 Rank	 Value	 Rank	 Value	 Rank	 Value	
Betweenness	Centrality	 1	 0.738	 9	 0.065	 7	 0.073	
Total	Degree	Centrality	 1	 0.055	 9	 0.006	 3	 0.015	
In-Degree	Centrality	 1	 0.067	 15	 0.006	 4	 0.016	
Out-Degree	Centrality	 1	 0.075	 13	 0.006	 3	 0.019	
Eigenvector	Centralitya	 1	 0.937	 27	 0.001	 2	 0.176	
Hub	Centralitya	 1	 0.956	 25	 0.001	 2	 0.176	
Authority	Centralitya	 1	 0.944	 26	 0.001	 2	 0.153	
    a Calculated using UCINET 6.0. 
 
d. SNA Conclusion 
The SNA of the Lebanese Civil War organizational network in December 1990 
supports the qualitative conclusion that the Syrian government had come to dominate the 
country of Lebanon through influence over a broad coalition of NSAs. The Syrian 
government was a part of the most influential clique and Newman subgroups. Al-Assad’s 
government also had the highest centrality scores of any organization in the network, and 
often by far greater margins than its nearest competitor. Additionally, Iran, in part due to 
its cooperation rather than competition with the Syrian government’s policy in Lebanon, 
also had a significant degree of influence in the network. Israeli influence in the network 
was very low according to the SNA, and any influence it did have in Lebanon came 
through its strong relationship with the U.S. government. The SNA of the organizational 
network at the end of 1990 confirms that Syrian influence in Lebanon far exceeded that 
of any other external state actor in the country. Additionally, Syria’s nearest state 
competitor for influence was often its own ally, whose actions by this point were largely 
beneficial to Damascus. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Analysis of the final years of the Lebanese Civil War provides valuable historical 
insights to state actors seeking to influence civil wars. Largely free of Israeli government 
interference beyond southern Lebanon following the failure of its 1982 intervention, the 
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Syrian government succeeded in achieving its limited policy objective for Lebanon by the 
end of 1990 through direct support of a heterogeneous coalition of violent and non-
violent NSAs that dominated the country. The Syrian government’s strongest regional 
ally, the Iranian government, complemented the Syrian policy through their support of a 
homogeneous coalition of NSAs transitioning into a more pragmatic approach that 
emphasized both violent and non-violent means by the end of the period. The 
establishment of Pax Syriana in Lebanon by the end of 1990 provides an example of what 
a relatively weak state can accomplish if given strong external logistical and political 
support. While the Iranian strategy effectively developed influence through the use of 
violence through the 1980s, their policy succeeded in the end because their leadership, 
and that of Hezbollah, moderated their approach in order to ensure long-term influence in 
Lebanon under the good graces of the dominant Syrian regime. The next chapter will 
provide an in-depth longitudinal SNA of the war to further refine the lessons gathered 




This thesis provides useful insights for the employment of surrogate warfare and 
direct military intervention in order to develop influence in civil wars. The similarities 
between Lebanon and Syria make these observations most useful for those governments 
and agencies currently addressing the ongoing conflict in the Levant, but these 
conclusions may prove useful in informing policy towards civil wars in general. This 
chapter will summarize the qualitative analysis of each state strategy through the conflict. 
A longitudinal SNA will further complement these qualitative insights. A compilation of 
the lessons learned will provide planners with a short list of the most relevant 
observations gathered from this study. The research limitations section provides a 
cautionary note as to the overall accuracy of the analysis. Finally, the conclusion will 
address how this study could prove useful to policy makers addressing ongoing civil 
wars. 
A. QUALITATIVE TEMPORAL ANALYSIS 
An in-depth historical analysis of external state efforts to influence the Lebanese 
Civil War reveals the successes and failures of three state strategies. The Syrian 
government’s strategic objective and efforts remained consistent throughout the war, 
earning al-Assad a dominant role in Lebanon as the conflict subsided. The Israeli 
government, disturbed by Syria’s dominance at the end of the first period, resorted to a 
direct approach that ultimately met with failure by the end of the second period, yielding 
influence over much of Lebanon to Syria from then on. The Iranian government, 
latecomer to Lebanon, adopted a very aggressive and effective strategy in the middle 
period, but by the end of the conflict moderated their strategy in order to ensure their 
future role in Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli conflict. A review of all three state strategies 
provides informative lessons to policymakers responsible for addressing civil wars. 
The Israeli approach toward the conflict in Lebanon began cautiously. In 1976, 
the Labor government under Yitzhak Rabin settled on a middle of the road strategy that 
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in the end afforded its enemies increased influence in Lebanon.402 As the Israeli 
government changed in 1977, so did its strategy in Lebanon. In 1982 the Likud 
government under Menachem Begin pursued regime reinforcement through direct 
military support of exclusively Christian militias under Bashir Gemayel. The new 
strategic approach created far more enemies of Israel in Lebanon than allies, and by the 
mid-1980s Israeli influence was confined to a narrow strip of land along the Israel-
Lebanon border. The Israeli government’s approach of direct military support to a 
Christian coalition with a preference for violence was a failure. 
Seizing the strategic opportunity largely created by the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in the summer of 1982, the Iranian government entered the conflict with the 
permission of its strategic ally in Damascus. The Iranians initially pursued a revisionist 
objective of regime overthrow through largely indirect support of a tight-knit 
homogeneous coalition of mostly Shia Islamists. While the strategy proved effective at 
coercing the other foreign forces in Lebanon to withdraw, conflict frequently arose 
between Iran’s ally Hezbollah and Syrian forces and their respective NSA allies, straining 
Iran’s ability to shape the course of the civil war in its favor. Following a transition in the 
leadership from revisionists to pragmatists in Tehran in the late 1980s, and subsequent 
moderation within Hezbollah’s leadership, Iranian influence within Lebanon began to 
increase.403 By aligning their overall interests with that of its ally in the region, and upon 
which its involvement in the country largely depended, Iranian and Hezbollah influence 
became legitimized under the Pax Syriana. 
Syrian government strategy throughout the Lebanese Civil War remained focused 
on securing its influence over the country as a critical subset to its national strategy to 
rebalance the Arab-Israeli conflict in Syria’s favor.404 During the first period, Syrian 
forces directly intervened in the conflict when it became clear to their leadership that 
indirect support of NSAs could not secure their objectives.405 Following the Israeli 
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invasion, Syrian forces adjusted their strategy to emphasize more indirect support to its 
NSA allies in light of their inability to directly confront the IDF and the foreign 
intervention that followed. As Israeli and foreign forces departed central Lebanon in the 
mid-1980s, the Syrian government gradually increased its direct means of support to its 
allies across the country. Encouraged by its strategic rival’s unwillingness to confront 
them beyond the southern border, and a more tolerant international climate as the final 
period came to a close, the Syrian government’s influence grew to dominate Lebanon. 
The long-term commitment by a relatively weak state to provide support to a large and 
heterogeneous coalition of NSA allies capable of employing both violent and non-violent 
techniques proved successful for Syria. 
B. LONGITUDINAL SNA 
A longitudinal social network analysis of the three organizational networks 
further highlights the successes and failures of each state strategy. It reinforces the 
conclusions drawn from the qualitative historical analysis of the three periods of the 
conflict. Syrian direct intervention, and Israeli tolerance in the first period temporarily 
secured the al-Assad government’s dominance of Lebanon. The Israeli government’s 
strategy of direct intervention in the middle period of the conflict earned it increased 
influence, and simultaneously decreased the influence of Syria. However, the 
combination of Syrian persistent engagement combined with Iran’s indirect support of 
violent NSAs quickly undermined the Israeli strategy and by the final period of the 
conflict Syrian influence was quantifiably dominant. 
Figure 4 presents the topographic metrics examined in this thesis over time. From 
1976 to 1990 the network became more cohesive, denser, and less hierarchical, with a 
greater degree of individual connections, more of which are reciprocal. By 1990 the 
network’s density has doubled; however, because network density is sensitive to network 
size, we need to rely more on average degree centrality in order to gain a sense of how 
internally connected the network became over time. Turning to average degree centrality, 
we see that it reached a peak in 1983 before dropping slightly in 1990. Nevertheless, the 
average degree centrality score in 1990 was still significantly higher than it was in 1976. 
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The network also became more cohesive over time. The network also became more 
heterarchical, or decentralized, over time as indicated by Krackhardt’s measure of 
hierarchy, as well as his measure of reciprocity. In sum, the longitudinal scores of the 
topographic metrics reflect a network that became more connected and less centralized, 
and as noted earlier, research suggests that networks with higher levels of density and 
connectedness are more likely to adhere to established norms and behavior.406 
Qualitatively, the 1990 network displayed this greater quantitative connectivity by the 
fact that most of the organizations in the network accepted conflict resolution rather than 
continued resistance. 
 
Figure 4.  Longitudinal Scores of Topographic Metrics 
A longitudinal analysis of the Newman subgroups offers further insights into the 
effectiveness of each state’s strategy over time. A graph of each state’s Newman group 
size and the number of external links is presented in Figure 5. The Israeli government’s 
Newman group increases slightly in 1983, but the state’s strategy emphasizing support to 
a homogeneous coalition of NSAs results in a decrease in connections beyond its 
subgroup. Israel’s Newman group membership was at its lowest point by 1990, further 
                                                





















































quantifying the government’s lack of influence. The Iranian Newman group size and 
external links were the largest in 1983 and declined in 1990, suggesting that by closely 
aligning its objectives with those of Syria, it may have sacrificed some of its influence. 
The Syrian Newman group evolution is perhaps the most interesting. Its size declined 
over time, but the number of external links rose, which may have offset any loss in 
influence. 
 
Figure 5.  Longitudinal Newman Subgroup Size and External Links 
The longitudinal analysis of each state’s centrality scores provides the strongest 
evidence for the effectiveness of each state’s strategy to develop influence throughout the 
Lebanese Civil War. Graphs of each country’s centrality scores over time are presented in 
Figures 6, 7, and 8. Four of Syria’s centrality scores (Figure 6) reflect a decline in 
influence immediately following the Israeli intervention period. By 1990 Syria’s 
dominant influence in the network is clearly reflected by the government’s significantly 
higher betweenness, eigenvector, hub, and authority centrality scores compared to the 
previous two periods. Israel’s centrality scores are dismal over the same periods, with a 
peak in betweenness centrality in 1983. However, as was already explained in the 1983 







































between the two components of the network. Iran’s influence is substantial according to 
its centrality scores in 1983, but by 1990 the state’s influence decreased as shown by the 
decline of all centrality measures except for betweenness. This conclusion is contrary to 
the widely accepted view that Iranian influence within Lebanon has consistently grown 
since 1982. However, this analysis is specific to influence within the organizations 
network within Lebanon. Clearly, since this period Iranian influence in Lebanon has 
grown dramatically through its own favored NSA, Hezbollah. 
 
























Figure 7.  Longitudinal Scores of Israel’s Centrality Measures 
 












































The longitudinal SNA of the Lebanese Civil War organizational network offers 
additional support for the conclusions drawn from the qualitative historical analysis. A 
visual comparison of the three networks in Figure 9 provides a visual synopsis of this 
overall analysis. Observe how in 1976 the network appears to contain multiple hubs, all 
of which appear to be a part of one overall component. This highlights the dominance of 
Syria in Lebanon in that period, with Israel accepting its influence at the time. In the 1983 
network there is an obvious schism as the network is divided into two major components 
as a result of the Israeli intervention. This visualization highlights the divide between the 
weakening Israeli coalition and growing Syrian one at the end of 1983. Finally observe 
the 1990 network, where there is clearly one major component dominated by Syria, and 
assisted by Iran, with Israel out on the edge of the network with few ties to other 
organizations. While the previous quantitative analysis of the longitudinal SNA data 
provides the detail to support the qualitative conclusions of this study, a comparison of 
the network visualizations provides a very simplified version of the story of Syrian 
success and Israeli failures in the Lebanese Civil War. 
 
Figure 9.  Networks over Time (1976, 1983, 1990) 
C. LESSONS LEARNED 
• Weak states with high levels of external support are capable of 
effectively developing influence in complex civil war environments. 
Despite Syria’s weak economy, domestic instability, and military 
vulnerabilities the al-Assad government’s approach in Lebanon was 
effective where other states with far more resources had failed. Compared 
to its competitors, Syria held a number of advantages to include a shared 
culture and history with the local population and extensive external 
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support from the Soviet-bloc, Iran, the Arab League, and in the end even 
the United States. The Syrian experience highlights the potential for 
strongly supported weak states to influence complex intrastate conflicts in 
which they share a common heritage with the local population and an 
enduring commitment to the conflict. 
• Homogeneous coalitions have limited value in complex civil wars. Both 
Iran and Israel preferred highly homogeneous coalitions largely based on a 
religious and cultural identity. In Lebanon this proved highly problematic 
given the fragmentation of the society along confessional lines. Both state 
strategies proved moderately successful at achieving high levels of 
influence amongst the targeted confessions, but faced significant 
challenges when it came to developing influence into other confessions. 
• Heterogeneous coalitions are more effective at facilitating sponsor 
influence in complex civil wars. The Syrian government employed a 
pragmatic policy of working with any group that would serve its practical 
interests. While this strategy could often appear fickle as al-Assad’s forces 
occasionally switched between allies, over time the strategy developed an 
expansive coalition that included NSAs from every major confession in 
Lebanon.  
• Balancing between indirect and direct means of support proved a 
more effective strategy to develop influence rather than relying on one 
or the other. Iran’s strategy through the second and third period was the 
most consistently indirect, and did produce significant results for Tehran 
and its allies in Damascus. However, the Iranian government’s policy in 
Lebanon was entirely dependent on Syrian approval and tolerance for its 
activities. The Syrian government also tried to rely on indirect methods as 
much as possible, but on multiple occasions resorted to direct methods in 
order to accomplish their objectives when indirect methods proved 
insufficient. The Israeli government’s over reliance on direct methods 
largely served to limit its influence in Lebanon. 
• Direct support comes with inherent risk whether employed by 
democratic or authoritarian governments. Direct support comes with 
many inherent risks for the sponsor as well as the surrogate. For the 
sponsor, the government risks blowback for directly intervening in another 
state’s affairs, especially if domestically it has the appearance of 
supporting the wrong side. The blowback the Israeli government 
experienced led to the collapse of its policy in Lebanon. The al-Assad 
government also faced an insurgency partly fed by the perception that in 
1976 the regime intervened on behalf of Christians rather than fellow 
Muslims. For the sponsored, direct intervention calls into question the 
legitimacy of the surrogate’s own cause. 
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• Violent surrogates that are dependent upon external support are 
capable of moderation. Following the Iranian government’s adoption of a 
more pragmatic foreign policy, the leadership of Hezbollah underwent a 
similar transition, thus adopting more political and non-violent techniques 
and reducing the organization’s employment of violence. While the 
transition was made possibly largely through the strong ties between the 
sponsored and the sponsor, the Iranian moderates also had the option of 
withholding assistance in the event that its surrogate force failed to 
moderate. 
• Sponsored NSAs are most effective when they combine both violent 
and non-violent techniques. The employment of violence alone is not 
enough for surrogates to succeed in an intrastate conflict. Many of the 
dominant NSAs in the Lebanese Civil War were political parties that also 
controlled a militia. In many cases, the political parties long preceded the 
militias, many of which were formed just before or after the beginning of 
the conflict. The NSAs that emphasized politics over violence were adept 
at switching as necessary between the two tactics, and in some cases 
decommissioned their militias once their political objectives were 
achieved at the end of the conflict. 
• Political support through negotiated ceasefires and power sharing 
agreements, no matter how temporary and difficult to achieve, can 
provide significant support to surrogates. Throughout the conflict Syria 
negotiated dozens, possibly hundreds of local ceasefire agreements in 
support of its NSA allies and proxies. These arrangements sometimes 
prevented significant defeats of its allies, providing them valuable respite 
from fighting to reconstitute their forces, and helped legitimize them 
diplomatically on a scale far beyond local politics. For Syria, these 
agreements allowed the state to conserve its resources, applying direct 
military support only when necessary.  
D. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The qualitative historical analysis and SNA of the Lebanese Civil War was 
limited in three ways. First, the data was skewed by individual researcher bias and data 
availability. After an initial assessment of the conflict, the three most significant external 
state actors were selected and research focused on each state’s strategy throughout the 
war. While conducting the research, there was a subconscious effort by the researcher to 
focus principally on groups of interest that came to dominate the Lebanese Civil War 
environment at the conclusion of hostilities. Employing a variety of sources focused on 
different historical periods, organizations, and individuals across the conflict mitigated 
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this selectivity bias. Secondly, contemporary writing on the Lebanese Civil War 
emphasizes the history of the perceived winners of the conflict because of their 
prominence in Lebanon today, most notably Hezbollah and Iran. The problem this creates 
when using recently published sources is the potential for an actor that is more relevant 
today being perceived as more relevant during a period of the conflict in which their 
influence was quite limited. For instance, the impact of Hezbollah in resisting Israeli 
occupation of Lebanon in 1983 may be highly exaggerated because of its contemporary 
relevance, whereas in reality at that time Hezbollah’s rival Amal, or other NSAs may 
have been more relevant at that time but failed to make the history books because of their 
later demise. While Hezbollah’s actions certainly were the primary reason for eventual 
Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon years after the civil war, during the middle 
period of the war Hezbollah was one of many groups fighting Israel in the south. The 
commitment to use both contemporary and older references helped mitigate this research 
limitation. Third, and finally, this research is far from exhaustive and the possibility 
exists that there are organizations that are for more relevant to this analysis than were 
revealed by the references explored. An analysis of fifteen years of conflict conducted 
over a relatively short period of time by a novice is likely to contain a number of research 
gaps and limitations. It should not be assumed that the lists of relationships in the SNA 
coding are exhaustive, and in reality there likely were many other relationships 
unobserved or simply unknown within the network. Further research could refine the 
organizational network of the three periods and could reach somewhat different overall 
conclusions. However, the overall conclusions from this study are strongly supported by 
historical evidence and should not be discounted based on research limitations. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of state strategies to influence the Lebanese Civil War environment 
provides useful insights to planners currently responsible for developing policies toward 
civil wars. The Lebanese Civil War is an informative case study for policymakers 
addressing the ongoing war in Syria because of the similarities between the two conflicts. 
Both conflicts are typified by highly complex intrastate fighting combined with extensive 
levels of external support and direct intervention. Despite the numerous confessional 
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divides within the two countries, the populations share a common cultural and historical 
background. Some of the same confessional divides that existed in Lebanon exist in Syria 
today. However, aside from the Kurds, the Syrian confessions have not yet fully 
mobilized under powerful social movements as occurred in Lebanon amongst the Druze, 
Maronites, and Shia. Much of this study focused on the actions of Hafez al-Assad’s 
government, whom Bashar al-Assad succeeded. Iran and Hezbollah were major players 
in the Lebanese Civil War and are currently actively involved in the ongoing Syrian 
conflict, continuing to back their staunch ally in Damascus. Israel is involved to a lesser 
extent in the conflict today than it was in Lebanon, but its policy of occasional direct 
military intervention to address the growing capabilities of its NSA rival Hezbollah 
shares similarities to the periods of the Lebanese conflict where Israeli forces targeted 
PLO bases. Though not all of the lessons from this study are transferable to the ongoing 
conflict, they should provide some applicable lessons learned compared to other 
historical case studies because of their similarities. The lessons of this case study are 
unique to the specific conditions of the war in Lebanon, and any application of lessons 
learned to other conflicts must be considered in light of that conflict’s unique conditions. 
It is the author’s hope that this thesis can help inform current policy through the lens of 
the Lebanese Civil War, providing policymakers a wider range of strategic options when 
developing strategies for civil wars. 
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APPENDIX. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY  
All three networks consist of both state and non-state actors that were significant 
players during their respective period. The non-state actors consist of both individuals 
and groups. The individuals are those major political and organizational leaders who, 
according to historical sources, were key actors during this period. The organizations are 
primarily the prominent militias of this time period. Each section was coded using a 
minimum of 19 primary and secondary sources. The complete list of sources used for 
SNA coding is in the list of references. 
The data was coded in terms of seven different types of relations, which are 
intended to reflect the organizations network in Lebanon at the end of the year noted. The 
six relations were: Alliances (organization-to-organization), political support 
(organization-to-organization), political support (organization-to-individual), logistical 
support (organization-to-organization), direct military support (organization-to-
organization), and members (individual-to-organization). The Alliance network consists 
of relationships between organizations and an alliance based organization such as: the 
status quo Lebanese Front (LF), the revisionist Lebanese National Movement (LNM), or 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The three political support networks reflect 
political support between nodes. The logistical support network reflects lines of logistical 
support between organizations that included financing, equipment, transportation, safe 
haven, or any combination thereof. The direct military support network consists of 
relationships reflecting direct military support, both kinetic and non-kinetic. Direct 
military support consists of any of the following types of ties: training, indirect fire 
support, close air support, or coordinated ground operations. The members network 
reflects individuals and their roles in their respective organization. 
All relationships were assessed on a scale of one to three, with a three being the 
strongest link. The strongest relationships were consistently those between states and 
their respective proxies and members to their organization. A two is a moderately strong 
link. An example of this would be ties between members of an alliance who only 
infrequently acted in the interest of the alliance organization’s goals. A one reflects a 
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weak link, an example of which would be two organizations that fought together but were 
no longer allied by the end of 1976. The scaling of relationships enabled a more accurate 
reflection of the constantly changing organizational network of the Lebanese 
environment. For instance, while the PLO was no longer in alliance with the LNM at the 
conclusion of 1976, they still shared a weak link to that organization because of their past 
ties. 
The six networks were analyzed as follows. Some of the networks were two-
mode, where two different types of nodes were present. The two-mode networks were 
converted to one-mode organization-to-organization networks using Organizational Risk 
Analyzer (ORA). The six one-mode networks were then aggregated into a single 
network, which was then was used to conduct all network analysis.407  
 
  
                                                
407 Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA) was used to estimate all SNA metrics. See ORA-NetScenes, 
Kathleen M. Carley, Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (Pittsburgh, 
PA: Carnegie Mellon University, Copyright 2001—2016). 
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